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Abstract.  This paper describes a cross-cultural research project on the relation between how 
people conceptualize nature (their mental models) and how they act in it. Mental models of 
nature differ dramatically among and within populations living in the same area and engaged in 
more or less the same activities. This has novel implications for environmental decision making 
and management, including dealing with commons problems. Our research also offers a distinct 
perspective on models of culture, and a unified approach to the study of culture and cognition. 
We argue that cultural transmission and formation does not consist primarily in shared rules or 
norms, but in complex distributions of causally-connected representations across minds in 
interaction with the environment. The cultural stability and diversity of these representations 
often derives from rich, biologically-prepared mental mechanisms that limit variation to readily 
transmissible psychological forms. This framework addresses a series of methodological issues, 
such as the limitations of conceiving culture to be a well-defined system or bounded entity, an 
independent variable, or an internalized component of minds. 
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I. Introduction. 
 This paper describes an ongoing body of research on environmental decision making. 
Our research program is framed in terms of folk biology and the focus is on the relationship 
between how people conceptualize nature and how they act in it. The context of primary interest 
is the lowland rainforest of Guatemala, but we will also bring evidence to bear from other 
Mesoamerican and North American settings where resource conservation is at issue.  
Perhaps the most central problem in environmental decision making is Hardin’s (1968) 
“tragedy of the commons,” where individuals acting according to their self-interest overuse and 
deplete resources. But this gloomy outcome does not always come to pass. A number of 
researchers have noted many examples where commons have been, and are being, successfully 
managed (Atran, 1986; Berkes, et al, 1989; Ostrom, 1999; Deitz et al., 2003). Key factors in 
success include a closed-access system and having social institutions in place to monitor use and 
punish cheaters (overusers, free riders).  
Although it is comforting to know that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, 
current conditions of globalization do not conform well with the constraints that have so far been 
identified. For a variety of reasons, closed access is increasingly difficult to achieve, and local 
institutions are increasingly confronted by, and giving way to, inter-group conflict over resource 
use. Our research program provides a new theoretical perspective on resource dilemmas, 
particularly those involving multiple cultural groups. We argue that how people conceptualize 
nature is linked with how people act in relation to it. In addition, we believe that cultural 
differences in mental models and associated values play an important role in creating inter-group 
conflict and, therefore, may hold the key to addressing these conflicts. 
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At the level of method, we offer techniques that are designed to facilitate cross-cultural 
research and comparison, but also aimed at avoiding the pitfall of reifying “culture” and treating 
it as an independent variable. Reifying culture wrongly equates reliable results with cultural 
patterning and homogeneity.  
Our research program is also closely tied to a distinct stance with respect to the 
conceptualization of culture and cultural models. Just as Darwin had to rely on an intuitive 
notion of species in the processes of ultimately deconstructing it, our approach is not aimed at  
establishing some true definition or identification of “culture” but rather to understand the factors 
and dynamics that lead to cultures as constructed categories. We begin with “cultures” as 
commonly described units - self-identified groups of individuals - and then trace the distribution 
of patterns of knowledge and beliefs both across and within cultures. It is these distributions, 
including their development and change that constitute the object of our study.1   
 From this standpoint, it is less useful to try to estimate population parameters for cultural 
norms – that is, shared values, beliefs and associated behaviors  – than it is to establish the 
pathways that determine how (in our case, biological) ideas affect (in our case, environmental) 
behaviors (and vice versa).  Accordingly, we describe emergent agreement patterns that are 
derived statistically from measurements of inter-informant agreement. To the extent that these 
agreement patterns overlap with patterns of self-ascribed cultures, we refer to such emerging 
models as “cultural models.” The focus of the research, however, is not a search for agreement 
patterns that overlap with self-ascribed cultural units, but rather understanding the underlying 
causes and dynamics of emerging agreement patterns.  
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 In the present paper, our focus is on illustrating in detail how the distributional view of 
culture plays a critical role in our program of research on environmental decision making, 
although the utility and implications of this approach extend beyond our specific examples. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review strengths and limitations 
of alternative views of culture. We go on to present a distributional view of culture and 
methodological tools tailored to it. Then we briefly describe the settings and populations for our 
research studies. With this as background, we proceed to review our research findings on mental 
models of the environment and their correlations with behavior.   
II. Culture as a Notional, not Natural, Kind 
Intuitively, one might define culture as the shared knowledge, values, beliefs and 
practices among a group of people living in geographical proximity who share a history, a 
language, and cultural identification (see Brumann, 1999 and associated commentaries for 
examples of this approach in anthropology). From a psychological perspective, Campbell’s 
(1958) proposed measures of social entitativity in terms of common fate, similarity, proximity, 
resistance to intrusions and internal diffusion seem applicable to cultural groups.  
But it is important to note that question of how culture should be defined is separable 
from the question of how best to study it. Although we think a definition of a culture in terms of 
history, proximity, language and identification is useful and (if not too rigidly applied) perhaps 
even necessary as a beginning point, it does not follow that the cultural content of interest must 
be shared ideas and beliefs.  
It’s not easy to escape from this intuitive notion of culture any more than it is easy for 
biology to escape from the notion of species as ahistorical, well-bounded entities sharing an 
underlying essence (e.g. Mayr, 1989).  In the same way that cultures are not natural kinds, 
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biological kinds don’t have the stable characteristics often attributed to them. Modern 
evolutionary biology is the study of change and not just stability. Continuing this parallel with 
evolutionary biology, we believe that modern cultural research must be able to overcome 
intuitive notions of culture in order to focus on causal processes associated with stability and 
change. Both biological and cultural research started with folk notions (of species and culture, 
respectively) and they have served each field well as starting points. Ultimately, though, such 
conceptions must be radically altered for further progress to be made.   
In the General Discussion we will return to the parallels between species in biology and 
intuitive notions of culture in cognitive science. Bearing in mind these issues concerning stability 
and change, we turn now to current stances on how culture and cultural processes should be 
studied. Each of them is useful for some purposes and all of them have limitations. 
1. Culture as Norms and Rules. It appears natural to think that the cultural contents of 
interest must be shared in order to qualify as “cultural.” Note, however, that this commitment 
undercuts the dynamic side of cultural processes: distinctive values, beliefs and knowledge might 
or might not be consensual within a culture.  For example, a culture may have a set of beliefs and 
practices known only to a privileged group of people (e.g. healers, elders, ruling elite) that 
nonetheless are powerful forces within a given culture (and distinguish one culture from 
another). In short, this view of culture as shared beliefs and practices not only prejudges the issue 
of what constitutes cultural content, but also, as a consequence, directs attention away from 
understanding the dynamic nature of social processes.   
 Some influential models of culture formation and evolution in biology and anthropology 
take a somewhat more liberal view of consensus. They are based on group-level traits that 
assume cultures are integrated systems consisting of widely-shared social “norms” (“rules,” 
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“theories,” “grammars,” “codes,” “systems,” “models,” “worldviews,” etc.) that maintain 
heritable variation (Rappaport, 1999; Laland et al., 2000; Wilson, 2002). Some political 
scientists also tend to view cultures as socially “inherited habits” (Fukuyama, 1995), that is, as 
socially transmitted bundles of normative traits (Huntington, 1996; Axelrod, 1997a).   
The interest in heritable variation loosens the restrictions on consensus and raises 
questions about the basis for variation. But here cognitive scientists are likely to be disappointed 
by the implicit assumption that the gist of cultural learning is the (more or less automatic) 
absorption of norms and values from the surrounding culture (by processes no more complicated 
than imitation). We believe that there are two problems with such an approach: First, it is not 
clear how people would decide what exactly to imitate. Second, these assumptions do not pay 
sufficient attention to the sorts of inferential and developmental processes that allow human 
beings to build and participate in cultural life.     
2. Cultural Psychology. The recent upsurge of interest in cultural psychology (for one 
review and critique, see Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002 and associated commentaries) 
has produced a variety of intriguing findings and has done psychology a service by calling 
attention to cultural variation. Many of these studies show that knowledge systems previously 
thought to be universal actually vary widely across the world (for a review, see Cohen, 2001). 
The lesson drawn is that: “Psychologists who choose not to do cross-cultural psychology may 
have chosen to be ethnographers instead” (Nisbett, et al., 2001:307). In brief, cultural psychology 
is succeeding in divesting academic psychology of implicit and ingrained ethnocentric biases. 
 What defines or constitutes cultural psychology? The area draws much of its inspiration 
from researchers such as Hofsteder (1980) and Triandis (1995) who sought to characterize 
cultural differences in terms of a small number of relevant dimensions. The project is successful 
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if multiple sources of evidence converge on the same small set of dimensions.  Examples of such 
dimensions that have received a lot of attention are individualism versus collectivism and 
egalitarian versus hierarchical social structure. Other researchers such as Nisbettt (2003) have 
used socio-historical analysis to derive dimensions of cultural differences in worldviews or 
preferred modes of thought. Examples of these dimensions are analytic and logical (categorical, 
axiomatic and non-contradictory) versus holistic and dialectical (thematic, no first principles or 
excluded middle). In short, Nisbett and his associates are suggesting that cultural studies must 
include not only contents per se, but also thinking processes that themselves may be 
differentially distributed across cultures. 
Cultural psychologists import the rigor and controls of standard experimental procedure 
into anthropological concerns, providing clear identification of the participants, thoughts and 
behaviors tested. Cultural psychologists are thus able to systematically exploit anthropological 
insights to demonstrate that mainstream psychology’s long-held assumptions about cognitive 
processes can be quite mistaken.  
In our opinion, cultural psychology has some limitations. The leap from statistical 
regularity in some sample population to “the culture” may suffer from precisely the sort of 
reasoning criticized in mainstream psychology’s leap from Americans or Europeans (or, more 
typically, psychology undergraduates) to the world at large. The same inchoate conception of 
culture once used by many anthropologists and still used by most ordinary folk remains 
customary in much cultural psychology. In this view, culture becomes a stable and shared set of 
beliefs, practices or strategies to be studied as yet another population parameter / personal 
attribute. This ahistorical, consensual view of culture limits the ability to explain and understand 
cultural differences once they are encountered. In other words, it is not clear how explanation or 
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interpretation can be extended beyond simple description. In some cases researchers have been 
able to exert some experimental control by priming tendencies to act individualistically versus 
collectively (e.g. Gardner, Gabriel and Lee, 1999, Briley, Morris and Simonson, 2000). These 
sorts of studies reinforce the dimensional analysis and potentially extend its scope. There is 
always the risk, however, of circularity in analysis. If priming does not affect some candidate 
task measuring individualism versus collectivism, then maybe the prime was ineffective or the 
task does not entail individualism and collectivism.  
Perhaps we are guilty of prejudging the initial phase of a two-stage project. In stage one 
cultural psychologists tend to characterize culture as an external, historically-determined system 
that becomes internalized in the individual through “acculturation” (or some other causally 
opaque process), either diffusely or as some specialized part of the psyche responsible for 
cultural (or social) cognition.  A stage two focus on within-culture variations in modes of thought 
might illuminate how different cultural institutions shape ways of thinking and vice versa.   
For cultural psychologists trained as anthropologists, the focus is on the “extrasomatic” 
or “extragenetic” nature of culture as an integrated corpus of external control mechanisms that 
program individual minds and bodies, molding them in patterned ways recognizable across 
individuals (Geertz, 1973).  We agree that expressions of the human psyche are profoundly 
embedded and structured within social and historical contexts, but we dissent from the invited 
implication of a one-way influence, with individual minds being passive recipients of “culture.”   
So far we have followed current practice in using the term, cultural psychology, to 
describe the recent upsurge of cross-cultural comparisons by cognitive and social psychologists. 
This may be a bit misleading in that one of the pioneers of the use of the term, Richard Shweder, 
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uses it refer to a set of ideas that entail rejecting psychic unity as well as rejecting the idea of 
characterizing cultural differences as variation along a small number of dimensions:  
“[C]ultural psychology interprets statements about regularities observed in a lab or 
observed anywhere else, on the street or in a classroom, in Chicago or in Khartoum, not 
as propositions about inherent properties of a central processing mechanism for human 
psychological functioning, but rather as descriptions of local response patterns contingent 
on context, resources, instructional sets, authority relations, framing devices, and modes 
of construal.” (Shweder, 1991, p.87)  
To avoid confusion in nomenclature, we will categorize Shweder’s approach to cultural 
psychology under the next framework, context and situated cognition. 
3. Context and Situated Cognition. There are alternative views of “cultural psychology” 
that call into question the use of standard forms of experimental procedure (“methodological 
behaviorism”) as fundamentally flawed on grounds that they are ethnocentrically biased in their 
focus on the individual mind/brain. Instead of considering cognitions to be embedded 
exclusively in individual minds - with “culture” as just one component of individual cognition - 
these theorists maintain that human cognitions should be properly situated in cultural-historical 
context and “practical activity” (Cole 1996; cf. Vygotsky, 1978). A related concern is that 
cultural cognitions may be better understood as “distributed cognitions” that cannot be described 
exclusively in terms of individual thought processes, but only as “emergent structures” that arise 
from irreducible levels of interactional complexity involving differential linking of individual 
minds in a given population (Hutchins, 1995).  
         Researchers such as Michael Cole believe that culture cannot be entirely conceptualized in 
terms of cognitions, belief systems and the like, but must instead consider a culture’s artifacts 
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(construed broadly enough to include language). Cole (1996) argues that subjects and objects are 
not only directly connected but also indirectly connected through a medium constituted of 
artifacts. These artifacts are simultaneously material and conceptual. One consequence of this 
view is an emphasis on studying cognition in context where cognitive labor may be distributed 
across individuals as well as artifacts (such as plumb lines or computers). Since context includes 
people’s conceptions of artifacts, it is inherently relational. 
        We share some of these concerns raised by the situated view, such as (1) difficulties with 
standard experimental procedures, including 2 X 2 designs with culture, in effect, treated as an 
independent variable (Medin & Atran, 2004), and (2) lack of concern with differential 
distributions of cognitions among minds within populations. For example, with respect to shared 
knowledge and beliefs Cole says: “in order to say anything useful, it is necessary to specify 
sources of coherence and patterning as a part of the ongoing activities that the inquirer wants to 
analyze” (Cole, 1996:124). We also agree that a focus on norms and rules is overly narrow, that 
cultural notions are intimately tied to the study of development, and that one good research 
avenue involves looking at how cognition plays out in particular contexts. 
         Other aspects of the situationist view seem vague. The idea that cognition is “stretched 
across mind, body, activity, and setting” is a useful framework notion that leads one to consider 
more than individual minds. At the same time, however, we believe that cultural situations and 
institutions cannot literally enter individual minds; rather, like other sorts of environmental 
stimuli they stimulate (in controlled and sequenced ways) mental processes that construct 
representations in accordance with a host of internal constraints, including evolved cognitive 
aptitudes like the folkbiology module (Medin & Atran, 2004). Cole (1996, p. 198) agrees with 
this assessment of internal constraints: “According to the version of cultural historical 
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psychology I am advocating, modularity and cultural context contribute jointly to the 
development of mind.”  
Perhaps a fair summary is that claims about cultural, historical analyses represent 
something of a promissory note (with respect to individual cognition) and research has tended to 
focus on situations and practices rather than the mediating mental representations associated with 
them. Strategically, this makes a certain amount of sense. In commenting on this section of this 
paper Ed Hutchins (Personal Communication, 11/9/2004) said: “If we situated guys have erred 
on the side of focusing on ‘situations and practices rather than the mediating mental 
representations associated with them’ it is because the latter have received plenty of attention, 
and the former are so understudied that their role in constituting the human mind has not been 
appreciated or understood by the majority of cognitive scientists. Furthermore, I believe that a 
better understanding of the former will change what we think to be accomplished by the latter.” 
Our only disagreement with this is that although cognition has been extensively studied, 
cognition in context has not; hence we see a continuing need to attend to mental representations. 
4. Culture as a Superorganism. One of the oldest, and most persistent, approaches to “the 
science of culture” is to consider culture an ontologically distinct “superorganism” whose “laws” 
are sui generis and do not arise from individual thoughts and behaviors, but which govern how 
individuals think and behave in social contexts (White, 1949). Anthropologist A.L. Kroeber 
(1923) first formulated the doctrine in this way:  
“Culture is both superindividual and superorganic…. [T]here are certain properties of 
culture – such as transmissibility, high variability, cumulativeness, value standards, 
influence on individuals – which is difficult to explain, or to see much significance in, 
strictly in terms of organic personalities and individuals.” 
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This “American” school of cultural anthropology, which viewed culture as a 
superorganism, soon merged with the “British” school of social anthropology known as 
“functionalism” (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Functionalism holds that the beliefs, behaviors and 
institutions of a society function with machine-like regularity of a well-adapted organism so as to 
promote the healthy functioning of social groups. According to A.R. Radcliffe Brown (1950):  
“In reference to any feature of a system we can ask how it contributes to the working of 
the system. That is what is meant by…its social function. When we succeed in 
discovering the function of a particular custom; i.e., the part it plays in the working 
system to which it belongs, we reach an understanding and explanation of it.” 
For the last half century, anthropology has mostly abandoned pretensions to a “science of 
culture” based in the law-abiding functional regularity of the adaptive superorganism.2 But this 
view has recently made a comeback under the evolutionary guise of “group selection.” 
According to philosopher Elliot Sober and anthropologist David Sloan Wilson (Sober & Wilson 
1998:150-176): “In most human social groups, cultural transmission is guided by a set of norms 
that identifies what counts as acceptable behavior,” and which “function largely (although not 
entirely) to make human groups function as adaptive units.” Norms are functioning parts of a 
“complex and sophisticated machine designed to forge groups into corporate units.” 
From this level of analysis, mental structures can be effectively ignored when trying to 
make scientific sense of culture. Although human cultures perhaps developed “to function as 
adaptive units via many proximate mechanisms” (Sober & Wilson, 1998:182), it is possible to 
study cultures as “phenotypes” without describing the proximate computational machinery that 
generates them: 
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As long as the proximate mechanisms result in heritable variation, adaptations will 
evolve by natural selection. There is a sense in which the proximate mechanism doesn’t 
matter. If we select for long wings in fruit flies and get long wings; who cares about the 
specific developmental pathway?… if humans have evolved to coalesce into functionally 
organized groups, who cares how they think and feel? (Sober & Wilson, 1998:193; see 
also Dennett, 1995:358-359).3  
  We believe, however, that understanding cultural formation and evolution depends 
profoundly on understanding the “proximate” cognitive mechanisms involved.  Perhaps we can 
best summarize with an analogy: macroeconomics is a legitimate field of study and generates 
important insights into economic activity on the basis of assumptions, for example, of an 
efficient market (and optimal individual behavior). But these insights do not in the least 
undermine microeconomics and, more to the point, observations from microeconomics, such as 
loss aversion (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (e.g. Thaler, 1985), 
have had a significant impact on macroeconomics. 
5. The Grammar of Culture. In anthropology, there is a long tradition of considering 
culture along the lines of language, that is, as being a rule-bound system with its own 
“grammar.” This view of culture is most strongly associated with the “structuralist” school of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) in France and Mary Douglas (1970) and Edmund Leach (1976) in 
Great Britain. On this account the bewildering variety of social phenomena and cultural 
productions are variations generated from a universal structure of the mind (a grammar of 
culture), which allows people to make sense of the world by superimposing a structure based on 
a few underlying principles. The structuralist’s task is to gather as many variations as possible of 
some grammatical subsystem of culture (e.g., myth, kinship) in order to identify the most 
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fundamentally meaningful components in the sub-system, and to discern the structure through 
the observation of patterning. Following the linguistic theory of Ferdinand Saussure in which 
phonemes (the smallest unit of linguistic meaning) are understood in contrast to other phonemes, 
structural anthropologists argued that the fundamental patterns of human thought are also based 
on a system of “binary contrasts” to produce more elaborate systems of cultural meaning.4 
Structural anthropology had little knowledge of the theories of cognitive architecture 
developed over the last few decades by cognitive and developmental psychologists, 
neuropsychologists or generative linguists. The fundamental properties attributed to the human 
mind, such as “binary contrast,” were few and simple-minded (or so general and vague as to be 
applicable willy-nilly to any phenomena at all).5 This is not to deny the insights that structural 
anthropologists garnered into the relationships between different aspects of cultural life within 
and across populations (e.g., linking myth, kinship, folkbiology, hunting and cooking practices, 
residential architecture, etc.). Instead, it is only to deny that structuralist theories provide any 
principled causal explanation concerning how these relationships might have come about. 
More current anthropological views of the grammar of culture are less committed to a 
specific theory of the cognitive architecture responsible for cultural productions than to the belief 
that culture consists of a bounded set of rule-bound systems, each with its own grammar-like 
structure. A more recent work in linguistic anthropology describes the “culture as grammar” 
view as follows: 
to be part of a culture means to share the propositional knowledge and the rules of 
inference necessary to understand whether certain propositions are true (given certain 
premises). To the propositional knowledge, one might add the procedural knowledge to 
carry out tasks such as cooking, weaving, farming, fishing, giving a formal speech, 
 16
answering the phone, asking for a favor, writing a letter for a job application. (Duranti, 
1997:28-29) 
Anthropology, then, is the discipline of “writing” the grammar of culture (Keesing, 
1972:302). From this perspective, it seems that virtually any patterned activity that numbers of 
people share in can be considered “grammatical,” from pottery making to story telling. For 
example, “religion belongs to the elementary grammar of culture” (Kannengeiser 1995; cf. 
Lawson & McCauley 1990). But there may be nothing interestingly “grammatical” (generated by 
few and finite rules) about how various cognitive systems link up together to make up “religion” 
(Atran, 2002; Atran & Norenzayan, in press) or “science” (Atran 1990; Atran 1998) or “culture.” 
 6. I-Culture. A somewhat similar view, that is more sophisticated but also problematic, 
has recently arisen among (some) evolutionary psychologists. It is modeled on Noam Chomsky’s 
distinction between the internal, individual grammar that a given person possesses (“I-
Language,” such as someone’s particular knowledge of American English) and the external 
language (“E-Language,” such as the countless dialects, words, and stylistic differences of the 
English language as it has developed across the world over the last thousand years or so). Just as 
the English language was shaped – and is still being shaped - by broad historical events that did 
not take place inside a single head (including the Norman invasion of England and the global 
internet), so too did Western European or Chinese or Navajo culture (Pinker 1992:71).6  
If the analogy holds, then psychology’s contribution to understanding “culture” might 
best focus on how children "grow" an I-Culture through the combination of an innate, 
biologically specified "culture acquisition device" and the exposure to stimuli in the world (or, 
equivalently, how individuals are capable at all of participating in “E-Culture”). As Gary Marcus 
(2004:27) proposes: “The very ability to acquire culture is, I would suggest, one of the mind’s 
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most powerful learning mechanisms.” This suggests a line of inquiry for culture studies parallel 
to that taken by generative linguistics over the past fifty years, in which the fundamental guiding 
questions include: "What do people know when they know 'culture'?" and "How do people come 
to acquire 'culture'?” 
Unlike the structuralist version of “culture as grammar,” this version does not prejudge 
the complexity or variety of cognitive mechanisms that may be involved in cultural acquisition. 
Like more current anthropological versions, however, it seems to assume that I-Culture is a 
bounded system, or an integrated collection of systems, generated (under appropriate experience) 
by some articulated set of cognitive principles.  
 But we contend that there is no systematically bounded or integrated culture as such.  
There is nothing at all “grammatical” or generatively rule-bound about the relations that connect, 
say, language, religion, the nation-state and science (or that connect the capacities to acquire 
knowledge of, and participate in, languages, religions, nation-states, and sciences). There are 
only family resemblances to what is commonsensically referred to as “culture” (or “religion” or 
“science”), but no overarching or integrated structure.  
7. Generativist (Agent-Based) Models of Culture. Recent advocates of agent-based 
computational models of cultural phenomena also sometimes borrow self-consciously from the 
framework of generative linguistics, where few and finite rules generate rich and complex 
structures. For most current agent-based models, however, the focus is not on the generative 
power of mental mechanisms as such (as it is for advocates of cultural grammar or I-culture) but 
on “connectionist” and “constructivist” modeling of how (micro)processes at the level of 
individual decisions and actions yield macrostructural cultural norms and other social 
regularities, such as spatial settlements (Dean et al, 1999), economic classes (Axtell et al, 1999), 
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political alliances (Axelrod & Bennett, 1993), voting patterns (Kollman et al, 1992), ecological 
management networks of religious water temples (Lansing & Kremer, 1993), and so on.  
To the generativist, explaining the emergence of macroscopic societal regularities, such 
as norms or price equilibria, requires that one answer the following question: How could 
the decentralized local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the 
given regularity? (Epstein, 1999:41) 
In agent-based models of cultural phenomena there is no central, “top-down” control over 
individuals. Rather an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous agents, situated in a 
specified spatial environment, begins to interact according to rather simple local rules (e.g., if 
agent X manifests behavior A in the immediate, spatially proximate neighborhood of agent Y at 
time T, then X and Y will both manifest A at time T1; never attack an immediate neighbor; trade 
with a neighbor only if that neighbor is red, etc.). Over time, these concatenated individual 
interactions generate – or “grow” – macrostructural regularities from the “bottom up”: 
Of course, there will generally be feedback from macrostructures to microstructures, as 
where newborn agents are conditioned by social norms or institutions that have taken 
shape endogenously through earlier agent interactions. In this sense, micro and macro 
will typically co-evolve. But as a matter of specification, no central controllers or higher 
authorities are posited ab initio. (Epstein 1997:42) 
There is much in this approach that we find congenial, including the: 1. interpretation of 
society (or culture) as a dynamic and distributed computational network created by and for its 
constituent interacting individuals, 2. realization that individual agents have “bounded” 
computing capacity and incomplete knowledge with regard to their own intentions and actions 
and well as the intentions and actions of others, 3. understanding that information in society is 
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transmitted, canalized, formed and possessed through endogenous interaction pathways (e.g., 
social networks), 4. realization that “emergent” macrostructural patterns and processes are 
neither wholly external to nor wholly internalized in individuals.7  
From a cognitivist standpoint, however, the requisite mental microprocesses in current 
agent-based models are relatively simple (e.g., imitation, following a conventional rule, etc.). 
These models also frequently incorporate functionalist views of cultural macrostructures as 
adaptive systems (cf. Sober, 1996) – a simplifying assumption that can lead to theoretical 
insights and provoke new empirical research (e.g., to the extent that cultural systems inevitably 
fall short of adaptive equilibrium), but which may not produce accurate descriptions or 
explanations of cultural stability. This same taste for simplicity is associated with a relative 
neglect of ecological context (save for spatial proximity of agents) and social processes (other 
than dyadic contacts). These limitations are matters of practice, not principle, and reflect the goal 
of seeing just how much complexity can derive from minimal assumptions. 
The most straightforward way to integrate our approach with agent-based modeling is to 
substitute empirical observations on cultural processes for the sorts of simplifying assumptions 
described above. Our enterprise (as well as that of other distributional theorists, such as Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985) is compatible with agent-based cultural modeling. Our eventual contribution to 
agent-based generations of cultural macrophenomena is to: (1) enrich microspecifications of 
agent behaviors and decisions by specifying the cognitive mechanisms involved, and (2) furnish 
ethnographically plausible patterns and principles for agent behaviors and decisions. Sufficiently 
enriched, agent-based modeling could become a key scientific instrument for understanding the 
distribution and stabilization of cultural phenomena, and a potentially powerful tool for empirical 
research. 
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Summary. There are no absolute standards for evaluating different notions about what 
constitutes relevant cultural contents or processes and how they should be studied. Framework 
theories are typically judged, not by whether they are right or wrong, but rather by whether they 
are useful. Utility, in turn, may vary as a function of goals. All of the above approaches have 
strong value relative to the default condition of much of experimental psychology that focuses 
solely on USA undergraduates at majority universities. The relative merits of one approach 
versus others can be understood in terms of their positions on underlying dimensions such as 
scope and specificity. The situated view and cultural psychology represent two end points on this 
continuum. Cultural psychology aims to identify a small set of cognitive processes that (are 
thought to) operate very widely. Viewing cultures in terms of shared norms and values also can 
reveal important cultural differences. In contrast, situationists are more impressed with the lack 
of transfer of cognitive skills across settings (e.g., Lave and Wenger, 1991).  
 The framework theory that we endorse draws on insights from a number of the theories 
we have just reviewed. In particular our focus is on cultural processes and consequently, our 
approach is first cousins of both the situation and agent-based modeling approaches. We now 
turn to our approach and lay out its methodological and conceptual implications. 
8. Cultural Epidemiology. In the norms and rules approach (including “memetics,” 
Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1995; Blackmore, 1999; cf. Atran 2001) there is a basic assumption 
that memory and transmission mechanisms are reliable enough for standard Darwinian selection 
to operate over cultural traits (i.e., the rate of mutation is significantly lower than the selection 
bias). On this view, inheritable variants (of ideas, artifacts, behaviors) are copied (imitated, 
reproduced) with high enough fidelity so that they resemble one another more than they do 
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unrelated forms. Only then can they be repeatedly chosen as favorable for cultural survival or 
eliminated as unfavorable by selection.  
We believe that these assumptions are limited because they pay insufficient attention to 
psychology; in particular they tend to neglect the sorts of inferential and developmental cognitive 
processes that allow human beings to build and participate in cultural life. For these reasons, we 
also believe that these various proposals for cultural “replication,” which are intended as 
generalizations of Darwinian processes of replication in biology, either suffer from vagueness 
(e.g. memetics) or pertain to highly limited sets of phenomena (e.g. the coevolution of animal 
domestication and lactose tolerance in Eurasian societies, or learning by imitation). Instead, we 
propose to look at cultures in terms of mental representations (and attendant behaviors) that are 
reliably but diversely distributed across individuals in a population (the population itself being 
circumscribed by the intersection of these various distributions). This is what we mean by 
“cultural epidemiology.”8  
Boyd, Richerson and their colleagues have modeled the distributions of beliefs and 
practices within and across populations, and also the stabilizing role of psychological biases in 
transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 2001), such as conformity to preferences that already 
prevail in the population and emulation in deference to the beliefs and behaviors of prestigious 
people (Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). We focus on the stabilizing role of 
cognitive structures in the production and transmission of ideas (and attendant behaviors) that 
achieve widespread cultural distribution. These may not be exclusively or even mainly shared as 
nearly-identical mental representations across individual minds, nor transmitted more or less 
intact from mind to mind through any other sort of high-fidelity replication (Sperber, 1996; 
Atran, 2001a). Imitation has strong limits with respect to replication - not only is it just a single 
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way of transmission, but also, given the many to one mappings between acts and mental 
representations of them (including their meaning), there’s no guarantee of any sort of fidelity. 
(Indeed, “imitation” often seems to us a term of folkpsychology that needs explanation rather 
than explains.) We suggest that much of the cultural transmission and stabilization of ideas 
(artifacts and behaviors) involves the communication of poor, fragmentary and elliptical bits of 
information that manage to trigger rich and prior inferential structures.  
The idea that cultural content may be distributionally unstable and seldom reliably 
replicated is far from new (e.g. Linton, 1936, Wallace, 1961, Roberts, 1964; see Gatewood, 2001 
for a review). For example, Wallace (1961, p.28) suggests that 
 “Culture shifts in policy from generation to generation with kaleidoscopic variety, and is 
characterized internally not by uniformity, but by diversity of both individuals and 
groups, many of whom are in continuous and overt conflict in one sub-system and in 
active cooperation in another.”  
What may be relatively novel in our approach is the focus on variability as the object of 
study. The degree to which cognitive content is actually shared or similarly inferred across 
individual minds may depend upon many factors in addition to pre-existing cognitive structures, 
such as the way the physical and social environment channel the transmission of information 
(e.g., mountains hinder the communication and spread of ideas, classrooms facilitate them). The 
various distributions of ideas across populations may also be determined to a significant extent 
by the history of economic, political and military relations between and within groups.  In the 
empirical body of this paper, we provide examples of how these different sorts of “canalizing” 
factors – cognitive, environmental, historical – interact to produce culturally identifiable 
behaviors. 
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At the risk of some oversimplifying, we summarize the eight approaches to culture under 
discussion according to their stances on five key issues in Table 1. As we suggested earlier, the 
cultural epidemiology view is most similar to the agent-based and situated cognition views. It 
differs from both these views in its focus on inference. Specifically, we suggest that these pre-
existing and acquired inferential structures account for the cultural recurrence and stabilization of 
many complexly integrated ideas and behaviors (see Boyer 1994; Atran, 2002 for religion) and 
set the parameters on allowable cultural diversification (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004).  
 
 
                                        Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
III. The Distributional View and Methodology 
Our choice of methodology is chiefly motivated by theoretical concerns related to a view 
of cultures as variably distributed patterns of modularly constrained cognitions within given 
populations. Here, we describe techniques for modeling cultural consensus in order to show 
systematic variation in how folkbiological knowledge is put into action to generate behaviors 
relevant to human survival. In addition, consensus modeling permits recovery of more graded 
patterns of variation within and between-populations (down to the level of the individual and up 
to the level of combining cultural patterns to show “metacultural” interaction and consensus). 
This enables us to explore the behavioral consequences and cognitive coping strategies 
(including patterns of information flow and exchange between individuals from different 
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populations) that are, for example, associated with processes of knowledge loss and devolution 
(described in Medin & Atran, 2004; see also Atran, Medin & Ross 2004).  
It is our view that: Cultures can be effectively studied as causally distributed patterns of 
mental representations, their public expressions, and the resultant behaviors in given ecological 
contexts. People’s mental representations interact with other people’s mental representations to the 
extent that those representations can be physically transmitted in a public medium (language, dance, 
signs, artifacts, etc.). These public representations, in turn, are sequenced and channeled by 
ecological features of the external environment (including the social environment) that constrain 
psycho-physical interactions between individuals (Sperber, 1996).  
Representations that are stable over time within a culture, like those that recur across 
cultures, do so because they are readily produced, remembered and communicated.9 The most 
memorable and transmissible ideas are those most congenial to people's evolved, modular habits of 
mind. Arguably, some of these habits of mind evolved to capture recurrent features of hominid 
environments relevant to species survival (Medin & Atran, 2004). One plausible example is the 
apparently universal and spontaneous disposition to categorize all and only plants and animals into 
mutually exclusive groups of essence-based species (i.e., folk generic species, such as CAT and 
REDWOOD), and to further taxonomize these groups into classes of groups under groups (e.g., folk 
life forms, such as MAMMAL and TREE, or folk specifics and varietals, such as TABBY and SHORT-
HAIRED TABBY). In all societies, it appears, this is done in a uniform, well-structured manner that 
is “not arbitrary like the grouping of stars in constellations” (Darwin, 1859:431; Berlin, 1992).  
 Once emitted, such core-compatible ideas will spread "contagiously" through a population 
of minds (Sperber, 1985). They are often learned without formal or informal teaching and, once 
learned, cannot be easily or wholly unlearned (Atran & Sperber, 1991). For example, when learning 
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about a new biological species – no matter how poor and fragmentary the stimuli (e.g., a single 
instance of a fuzzy drawing) - people “automatically” interpret it to have a unique causal essence 
that enables it to be assigned a fixed place in their folkbiological taxonomy.  
 A significant departure from a shared norms and rules perspective is that the variable 
distribution of ideas is treated as signal, not noise. The distribution view uses a set of techniques 
for assessing group-wide patterns that statistically demonstrate cultural consensus or lack 
thereof. In our work we have relied extensively on the cultural consensus model (CCM) of 
Romney, Weller and Batchelder (1986), an important tool for analyzing commonalties and 
differences within and across cultural groups. The CCM has been used as an effective tool by 
cognitive anthropologists (e.g. Romney and Batchelder, 1999, Romney, et al, 1996; Moore, et al, 
2000). 
The Cultural Consensus Model (CCM). Before describing the cultural consensus model 
in detail three general points are in order:1. The CCM does not prescribe which ideas should be 
studied any more than analysis of variance dictates which variables should be measured, 2. It is 
not a theory of culture but rather a tool that can be used to evaluate such theories, 3. although its 
most natural use and interpretation focuses on consensus, it also can be effectively used to 
examine within- and across-group differences (analysis of variance  could also be used to detect 
between group differences but it is less effective in identifying within group patterns and 
pinpointing cross-group differences).  
The cultural consensus model assumes that widely-shared information is reflected by a 
high concordance among individuals. When there is a single cultural consensus, individuals may 
differ in their knowledge or “cultural competence.”  Estimation of individual competencies is 
derived from the pattern of inter-informant agreement indices on the first factor of a principal 
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component analysis (essentially factor analysis). These competency scores should not be 
mistaken for scores of expertise. The cultural model provides a measure for culturally shared 
knowledge and hence the levels of competencies measure the extent to which an individual 
shares what everyone else agrees upon.  
There are three standard assumptions of the original version of the CCM: 1. each item has 
a (culturally) “correct” answer (items are dichotomous), 2.  items are independent given the 
culturally “correct” answers, and 3. each respondent has a fixed competence over all questions 
(i.e., the items are homogeneous). Batchelder and Romney have analyzed the effects of relaxing 
these axioms or assumptions in a number of subsequent publications (e.g. Batchelder and 
Romney, 1989, Romney, Batchelder and Weller, 1987; Karabatsos and Batchelder, 2003). 
Although the CCM is a formal model designed for fixed-format questionnaires (true-
false, matching, or multiple choice), it can also be used as a “data model” for more open-ended 
responses such as sorting items into a hierarchical taxonomy (see Romney, Batchelder and 
Weller, 1987). In this instance the individual informant data consists of an item by item matrix of 
distances between all pairs of items and these are used to establish similarities or agreement 
indices between all pairs of participants. The participant distance matrices are then correlated 
with each other and represent a measure of the degree to which each participant’s taxonomy 
agrees with every other participant’s taxonomy. The participant by participant correlation matrix 
is the input to the principal components analysis.  
Assuming that the correlation between two informants’ sorting patterns is entirely due to 
the connection of each of them to the consensus knowledge, the data model approach creates a 
quantity in the first factor that is a proxy for consensus knowledge (Batchelder, Personal 
Communication, 1/26/04; see Romney, 1998 for further discussion and an application). For 
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interval data, the first factor loading in a principal components analysis becomes an estimate of 
how much an individual knows. In other words the data model provides estimates of consensus 
as the correlation of the individual with the aggregate. This data model is similar to reliability 
theory with the role of individual and item reversed, and produces an insignificant reliability 
overestimation compared to the formal model. This is because an item in the formal model is 
supposedly correlated with the cultural “truth,” whereas an individual in the data model is 
correlated with an aggregate including that individual (Romney, Personal Communication, 1995; 
see also Romney, et al, 1986)10. 
A cultural consensus is found to the extent that the data overall conform to a single factor 
solution. Specifically, the first latent root  - or eigenvalue - is large in relation to all other latent 
roots, and individual scores on the first factor are strongly positive. A good guideline is when the 
ratio of the first to second eigenvalue is at least 3:1.  
Of course, general agreement may be coupled with systematic disagreement and the 
CCM is an effective tool for uncovering both shared and unshared knowledge. Another desirable 
characteristic of the CCM is that degree of agreement can be used to determine the minimum 
sample size needed to estimate the cultural consensus within some range of tolerance. In some of 
our studies as few as ten informants are needed to reliably establish a consensus. 
Assuming that a single factor solution is satisfactory, the first factor scores for each 
informant represent an estimate of “cultural competence.” For example if one person has a first 
factor score of .90, then the best estimate is that their responses reflect 90% agreement with the 
overall consensus. Lower competence scores indicate less agreement with the consensus. For 
example, a person with a first factor score of .80 would have made more “errors” or disagree 
more with the consensus than the informant with a .90 score. After the consensus parameters are 
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estimated for each individual, the expected agreement between each pair of subjects is generated 
(as the product of their respective consensus parameters). In the above example the expected 
agreement between the two informants would be .90 times .80 (or .72). These products are used 
to generate an informant by informant expected agreement matrix. Next, the expected agreement 
matrix is subtracted from the raw agreement matrix to yield a matrix of deviations from expected 
agreement (cf. Hubert & Golledge, 1981). If raw and residual agreement are significantly 
associated, then a significant portion of residual agreement consists of deviations from the 
consensus. One can then explore other factors (e.g. cultural subgroups, social network distance), 
which might predict or explain the residual agreement. For example, Boster (1986) found that 
among the Aguaruna Jívaro (Ashuar) people there was a shared cultural model for the 
identification of various varieties of manioc and that deviations from this shared model were 
related to membership in kin and residential groups (that is, agreement within these groups is 
higher than what one would predict on the basis of the overall cultural model).11  
Another marker for reliable residual agreement is when an analysis over two or more 
groups reveals systematic differences in factors beyond the first. If two groups differ in their 
second factor scores, then within group agreement extends beyond the overall consensus. For 
example, Medin et al, 1997 asked tree experts to sort local species of trees and found clear 
overall consensus, coupled with second factor scores correlating strongly with occupation (e.g. 
parks maintenance, taxonomist, landscaper). Subsequent comparisons revealed systematic 
differences in the basis for sorting across these groups. 
In the case of an existing consensus, the CCM justifies the aggregation of individual 
responses into a “cultural model.” The CCM gives an estimate of the levels of agreement among 
the informants. Therefore, it is possible to use this model to explore agreement patterns both 
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within and across different populations, the latter describing potential “meta-cultural” models. 
This promotes exploration of possible pathways of learning and information exchange within and 
between cultural groups, illuminating more general processes of cultural formation, 
transformation and evolution.   
Once cultural differences are found, we can proceed to ask a series of more analytic 
questions about things like: 1. Are these ideas spread by means of abstract models and inference 
strategies or is the information conveyed in quite literal, concrete form? 2. Do factors like 
income or occupation or density of social networks or a variety of other input conditions 
moderate cultural differences (either within or between groups)?  Within the present framework 
the goal in studying variation is to have a theory about the distribution of ideas and flow of 
information, not to isolate some reified entity, "culture" (see Ross, 2004).  
Summary. In a companion paper we argue that there are universal constraints on how 
people organize their local knowledge of biological kinds (Medin & Atran, 2004). These 
evolutionary constraints form a "learning landscape" that shapes the way inferences are 
generalized from particular instances or experiences. It produces consensus even though specific 
inputs vary widely in richness and content. Thus, many different people, observing many 
different exemplars of dog under varying conditions of exposure to those exemplars, may 
nonetheless generate more or less the same concept of dog. To say an evolved biological 
structure is “innate” is not to say that every important aspect of its phenotypic expression is 
“genetically determined.” Biologically poised structures “canalize” development, but do not 
determine it – like mountains that channel scattered rain into the same mountain-valley river 
basin (Waddington, 1959).  
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In this paper, we argue that a culturally-specific learning landscape further constrains the 
canalization process, much as an artificially-built dam further channels the flow and shapes the 
path of water in a natural river basin (Sperber, 1996; Atran, 2002).  The existence of any 
systematic distribution of ideas and behaviors, or cultural “path,” results from an integration of 
distinct cognitive, behavioral, and ecological constraints that neither reside wholly within minds 
nor is recognizable in a world without minds (in this respect we agree with the situated cognition 
view). Cultural paths do not exist apart from the individual minds that constitute them and the 
environments that constrain them, any more than a physical path exists apart from the organisms 
that tread it and the surrounding ecology that restricts its location and course. As Inagaki and 
Hatano (2002) suggest, it is the confluence of these various sources of constraints that makes 
cross-cultural comparisons possible and meaningful. 
 IV. Garden Experiments in Mesoamerica and North America 
There is little or no detail available in typical normative accounts of social structure in the 
anthropological literature that would allow evaluation of patterns of individual variation, 
agreement and disagreement within and between groups. Without such detail, normative claims 
are difficult to verify or falsify. The overarching reason is simple: anthropologists are typically 
instructed to go out into the field alone for some months or – in exceptional cases – some few 
years and bring back a description of the society studied. The popular image of the 
anthropologist with a pith helmet and notebook is not very far off the mark; only now the pith 
helmet is a baseball cap or canvas fedora, and the notebook is a PC. In this situation, there is 
little alternative to normative description (excepting the “narratives” of anti-positivist post-
modernism, which do little to foster dialogue with the larger scientific community).  
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Detailed analyses of the relations between ecology, technology, social networks and so 
forth require large interdisciplinary efforts, over many field seasons, at a cost that usually 
exceeds typical ethnographic fieldwork by one or more orders of magnitude. The pertinent 
academic and government funding institutions are not set up for this kind of project, and so the 
effort is rarely made (for a notable exception, see Henrich, et al, 2001). We have been fortunate 
to be involved in two such efforts: one in Mesoamerica and another in North America. 
A case study on the importance of cultural models versus environmental determination 
comes from a variation on the “common garden experiment” in biology. When members of a 
species have different phenotypes in different environments, samples are taken from both 
environments and replanted in only one. If the differences still exist, they are probably genetic 
(two genotypes); if not, then they are probably environmental (one genotype producing two 
phenotypes). Here we use a variation on this experimental approach. Our aim is not to 
distinguish genetic nature from environmental nurture but rather to isolate the role of certain 
socio-cultural factors (social networks, cognitive models) from other economic (sources and 
level of income), demographic (family and population size), and ecological factors (habitat and 
species) in environmental management. Evidence for the importance of culturally transmitted 
factors on behavior would be data showing that groups of people who have different cultural 
histories and cultural ideas behave differently in the same physical environment. 
         Study Populations and Context. In the next several paragraphs we describe the main study 
populations in our research.  
          Mesoamerican populations. A key focus of our work concerns three cultural groups in 
the same municipality in Guatemala’s Department of El Petén: native Itza' Maya, Spanish-
speaking immigrant Ladinos and immigrant Q’eqchi’ Maya. Itza’ and Q’eqchi were each 
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circumscribed by entirely overlapping and perfectly redundant criteria of proximity of residence, 
ethnic self-identification, and a multigenerational history of pervasive family interconnections. 
The Q’echi’ were also identified by their mother tongue. The Ladino population was initially 
circumscribed by proximity of residence, language (Spanish), ethnic self-identification and lack 
of a community-wide history of family interconnections. In addition, members of each 
community readily and distinctly identify the group affiliation of members of the other 
communities. This initial circumscription of cultural groups obviously relied on commonsense 
conceptions of cultural differences, but our analyses and subsequent findings were not bound by 
these initial selection criteria (see the observations on circularity in cultural research in the 
General Discussion). 
In all groups, men are primarily occupied with practicing agriculture and horticulture, 
hunting game and fish, and extracting timber and non-timber forest products for sale. Women 
mainly attend to household gardening and maintenance. The climate is semitropical, with quasi-
rainforest predominating (tropical dry forest or hot subtropical humid forest). Topographic and 
microclimatic variation allow for a dramatic range of vegetation types over relatively small 
areas, and sustaining both this diversity and people’s livelihood over the last two millennia has 
required correspondingly flexible agro-forestry regimes (Sabloff & Henderson, 1993; Atran, Lois 
& Ucan Ek’, 2004). 
 Native Itza’ Maya. The Itza’, who ruled the last independent Maya polity, were reduced 
to corvée labor after their conquest in 1697 (Atran, et al, 2004). San José was founded as one of a 
handful of "reductions" for concentrating remnants of the native Itza’ population (and fragments 
of related groups). In 1960, the military government opened the Petén (which includes 35,000 
km2, about 1/3 of Guatemala's territory) to immigration and colonization. In the following years, 
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about half the forest cover of Petén was cleared. In a project engineered by the Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and supported by a debt for nature swap, Guatemala’s 
government set aside remaining forests north of 17˚10' latitude as a Maya Biosphere Reserve, a 
designation recognized by UNESCO in 1990. The San José municipality now lies within the 
Reserve’s official “buffer zone” between that latitude and Lake Petén Itza’ to the south. Today 
San José has some 1800 habitants, about half of whom identify themselves as Itza’, although 
only older adults speak the native tongue (a Lowland Mayan language related to Yukatek, 
Mopan and Lakantun).  
Immigrant Ladinos. The neighboring settlement of La Nueva San José was established in 
1978 under jurisdiction of the Municipality of San José. The vast majority of households (about 
600 people) are Ladinos (native Spanish-speakers, mainly of mixed European and Amerindian 
descent) most of whom were born outside of Petén. The majority migrated to the area in the 
1970s as nuclear families stemming from various towns of southern Guatemala. 
Q’eqchi’ Maya .The hamlet of Corozal, also within the Municipality of San José, was 
settled at the same time by Q’eqchi’ speakers, a Highland Maya group from the Department of 
Alta Verapaz just south of Petén. Q’eqchi’ filtered in as nuclear families, migrating in two waves 
that transplanted partial Highland communities to Corozal: a) directly from towns in the vicinity 
of Cobán (capital of Alta Verapaz), b) indirectly from Alta Verapaz via the southern Petén town 
of San Luis (home to a mixed community of Q’eqchi’ and Mopan Maya). Q’eqchi’ immigration 
into Petén began as early as the 18th century, though massive population displacement into Petén 
is recent. The Q’eqchi’ now constitute the largest identifiable ethnic group in Petén while 
maintaining the smallest number of dialects and largest percentage of monolinguals (Wilson 
1995:38; cf. Stewart 1980). This reflects the suddenness, magnitude, and relative isolation of the 
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Q’eqchi’ migration. Although many of the nearly 400 Q’eqchi’ of Corozal understand Spanish, 
few willingly converse in it. Q’eqchi’ is not mutually intelligible with Itza’. To help understand 
results with Lowland Q’eqchi’ immigrants, we also studied a native Highland Q’eqchi’ group.  
North American Populations.  Resource conservation and conflict over it are also 
important issues in Wisconsin where majority culture and Native American hunters and 
fishermen may conceptualize nature in distinct ways. 
 Menominee. The Menominee (“Wild Rice People”) are the oldest continuous residents of 
Wisconsin. Historically, their lands covered much of Wisconsin but were reduced, treaty by 
treaty, until the present 95,000 hectares (about 240,000 acres) was reached in 1854. There are 4-
5000 Menominee living on tribal lands in and around three small communities. Over 60% of 
Menominee adults have at least a high school education and 15% have had some college. The 
present site was forested then and now - there are currently about 88,000 hectares of forest. 
Many of the vast Great Lakes forests did not survive the post civil war flurry of logging. In 
contrast, Menominee have practiced logging on a sustainable basis for the last 150 years. The 
Menominee reservation is managed by a tribal legislature. Sustainable coexistence with nature is 
a strong value (Hall & Pecore, 1995). Hunting and fishing are important activities for most adult 
males and for many females. Fishing is practiced on the reservation’s many lakes and streams.  
The tribe sets specific rules for both fishing and hunting on the reservation, one of them 
specifically outlawing the “wanton destruction” of any species. 
Rural Majority Culture. Adjacent to the Menominee reservation is Shawano County, 
which consists of farmland, small forests, and numerous lakes and rivers. The county was well-
settled by 1850 and a substantial portion of the current population can trace its origins in the area 
to 19th century immigration. As for the Menominee, hunting and fishing plays a big role in the 
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social and recreational life of the Majority Culture people. Most fishing is on the Wolf River or 
Shawano Lake (which also attracts a lot of fishing tourists). Compared to Menominee fishermen, 
fishing for food source is a lesser priority for majority-culture fishermen, who are more 
interested in fishing for sport. Thus, it is not surprising that catch and release fishing plays a 
somewhat more important role off the reservation than on it. Finally, while Menominee can 
purchase a fishing license for off-reservation fishing, majority culture people cannot fish on the 
reservation. Fishing is done during all seasons, including ice-fishing in winter.  
V. Folkecology and the Spirit of the Commons. 
In earlier studies, we found that Itza’ Maya informants consistently appealed to 
ecological relations on category-based induction tasks unlike USA college students who focused 
on taxonomic relations: for example, generalizing a property of bats to horses on the grounds that 
horses are likely to be bitten by bats (reviewed in Medin & Atran, 2004). Although we did not 
have corresponding data from Q’eqchi’ and Ladino adults on such tasks, the Itza’ propensity for 
ecological reasoning, coupled with their record of sustainable agro-forestry, suggested to us that 
there may be a connection between folkecological models and behavior. Furthermore, the fact 
that the Ladino and Q’eqchi’ populations practice agro-forestry in a much less sustainable 
manner, provided the opportunity to explore whether understandings of the forest are correlated 
with action on it. These conjectures led us to a series of systematic cross cultural and within 
cultural comparisons that are pertinent to a variety of conceptual issues in cognition, decision 
making, and culture theory (Atran et al.,1999a, 2002; Medin et al., 2002; see also Ross 2002; 
Ross & Medin, in press).  Evidence for the importance of culturally transmitted cognitive models 
on behavior would indicate that groups of people who have different cultural histories and 
cultural ideas behave differently in the same physical environment.  
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We have employed a threefold approach to understanding causal relations between 
individual cognitions, human behaviors that directly affect the environment, and cultural patterns 
that emerge from population-wide distributions of cognitions:  
1. Folkecology. This involves a cross-cultural methodology for modeling people's 
cognitions of the ecological relationships between plants, animals and humans.  
2. Cultural Epidemiology. This involves ways of mapping individual variation and inter-
informant agreement in the flow of ecologically-relevant information within and 
between societies, using social network analysis to trace potential transmission 
pathways in transfer of knowledge.  
3. Spiritual Values and the Commons. This involves operationalizing the role of “non-
economic” entities and values, such as supernatural beings, in environmental 
cognition and behavior.  
The Lowland Maya region faces environmental disaster, owing in part to a host of non-
native actors having access to the forest resources (Schwartz, 1995). A central problem concerns 
differential use of common-pool resources, such as forest plants, by different cultural groups 
exploiting the same habitat. As we noted earlier, one strong view is that individual calculations 
of rational self-interest collectively lead to a breakdown of a society’s common resource base 
unless institutional mechanisms restrict access to co-operators (Hardin, 1968, Berkes et al., 
1989). The reason is clear: in the absence of monitoring and punishment, exploiters gain the 
same benefits as co-operators but at reduced cost. Co-operators are driven to extinction, and 
exploiters flourish until the commons is destroyed. Still, exclusive concern with economic 
rationality and institutional constraints on action may not sufficiently account for differences in 
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environmental behaviors (Ostrom, 1998). To make better sense of these differences, we 
examined links between environmental cognitions and behaviors. 
1. Folkecology 
Although folktaxonomies are structured similarly across diverse cultures, this leaves 
aside important insights into how people actually parse the content of local biodiversity and 
reason about it. More generally, it ignores how people cognize the environment in ways relevant 
to behavior. There are precedents for our attempt to fill this void (e.g., Posey, 1983); however, to 
our knowledge, what follows is one of the first attempts to show the role of cognitive and 
cultural orientation in deforestation and land use. 
The Common Setting.  
As noted earlier, Petén’s forests comprise a common pool resource that is rapidly being 
depleted. The deforestation rate, which averaged 287 km2 yearly between 1962 and 1987, nearly 
doubled to 540 km2 in 1988-1992, as population rose from 21,000 to over 300,000. Population 
estimates for 1999-2000 ranged from 500,000-700,000. A new European-financed paved road 
now links Guatemala City to Flores (the former Itza’ capital of Petén). Projections based on 
remote sensing and ground measurements indicated a 14.5% increase in rate of deforestation 
during 1999-2000. No doubt a major cause of deforestation is population pressure from the 
overcrowded and tired lands of southern Guatemala. However, our data indicate that different 
populations, who engage in the same activities, have very different impacts on the environment, 
suggesting a more complex relation between population processes and ecological degradation. 
For all three groups, people pay rent to the municipality for a farm plot. All actors pay the 
same rent (set by the Municipal Council). Rent does not vary as a function of the productivity of 
the land and is not based on a share of the product. Each household (about 5 persons) has 
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usufruct rights (i.e., use, but not ownership title) on 30 manzanas (21.4 hectares, or about 50 
acres) of ejido land (municipal commons). Farmers pay yearly rent of less than a dollar for each 
manzana cleared for swidden plots, known as milpas, whose primary crop is maize. All groups 
practice agriculture and horticulture, seek fish and game, and extract timber and non-timber 
forest products for sale.  
 People can hold plots in scattered areas and can change plots. Plots from all groups may 
abut. Hunting is tolerated on neighbors’ plots, but not access to another’s crops or trees. Itza' and 
Ladinos interact often, as their villages are 1 km apart. Q'eqchi’ live 18 km from both groups; 
however, daily buses connect the Q’eqchi’ to the other two groups (who also farm regularly 
around the village of Corozal).  
Multiple converging measures of soils, biodiversity, and canopy cover indicate that Itza’ 
promote forest replenishment, Q’eqchi’ foster rapid forest depletion, and Ladinos fall somewhere 
in between (Atran, et al. 1999, 2002). For example, for every informant in each population we 
sampled one hectare (2.5 acre) plots from their agricultural land (milpa), fallow land (guamil) 
and forest reserve. For each plot, we measured species diversity, tree count, coverage (m2 foliage 
for each tree crown), and soil composition. Measurements of behavior patterns and their 
consequences for soils corroborate patterns from reported behavior, suggesting that Itza’ 
agroforestry practice encourages a potentially sustainable balance between human productivity 
and forest maintenance,  Given the results from our sample plots, we estimated that Q’eqchi’ 
forest-clearance rates (i.e., amount of land cleared divided by number of years that land is 
cultivated) are more than five times greater than those for Itza’ (Atran, et al., 2002). Ladino rates 
are twice that of Itza’. Remote sensing confirms the pattern of deforestation along Q’eqchi’ 
migration routes for Petén (Sader, 1999).    
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 Despite these objective differences in practices, Itza’ tend to believe that Ladinos have 
more destructive practices than do Q’eqchi’ (11 of 14 Itza’ indicated this in an informal survey). 
Several factors may mediate this misperception. First, both Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ see themselves as 
Maya and might as well subscribe to an underlying essential ethnic / racial unity (see Gil-White 
2001). Second, the Q’eqchi, but not the Itza’, have retained corporate rituals for planting and 
harvesting (that the Itza’ are now starting to adopt). These rituals tend to reinforce communal 
sharing and responsibility, which Itza’ mistakenly believe extend to Q’eqchi’ attitudes and 
actions towards the forest. Third, as will be seen later, Itza’ interact with Ladinos on issues about 
the forest, and so may be more aware of the relative ignorance of the Ladinos. 
Mental Models of Folkecology.  
Because analyses revealed no reliable between-population differences in age, family size, 
land available to cultivate or per capita income from all traceable sources, we sought to 
determine if group differences in behavior are reflected in distinct folkecological models. In 
preliminary studies, we asked informants from each of the three groups "which kinds of plants 
and animals are most necessary for the forest to live?" From these lists we compiled a consensual 
set of 28 plants and 29 animals most frequently cited across informants from the communities 
(plant kinds were all generic species, except for two life forms, GRASS and BUSH). The 28 plants 
in the study include 20 trees and 1 ligneous vine counted among the species in the preliminary 
study. Although these 21 species represent only 17% of the total number of species enumerated, 
they account for 44% of all trees in Itza' parcels, 50% in Ladino parcels, 54% in Q’eqchi’ 
parcels. This confirms the salience of the species selected for the folkecology study (Table 2).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Plant – Animal Interactions.  Instructions and responses were given in Itza', Spanish or 
Q'eqchi’. Twleve informants from each population were asked to explain how each plant helped 
or hurt each animal, and how each animal helped or hurt each plant. Note that the focus of both 
the questions and the answers was on patterns of individual actions rather than long-term 
population change or stability. Thus a predator hurts its immediate prey but may help protect the 
prey from consequences of overpopulation. Our informants would report this type of relation as 
the predator hurting the prey (See Atran, et al, 2002 for more detail). 
The procedure had two parts. We asked participants how each plant affected each animal. 
The task consisted of 28 probes, one for each plant. On each trial, all animal picture cards were 
laid out and the informant was asked if any of the animals  “search for,” "go with" or "are 
companions of" the target plant, and whether the plant helped or hurt the animal. Questions were 
pretested for simplicity and applicability across cultures. Unaffiliated animals (those that a given 
informant said had no specific relation to any of the plants) were set aside. For each animal, 
informants were asked to explain how the plant helped or hurt the animal (plant -> animal). Next, 
they were asked how each animal helped or hurt each plant (animal -> plant). To explore 
interactions among people and plants, we asked each informant to explain whether people in 
their community actually help or hurt each item on the plant list, and vice versa.  
For each task, we used the CCM to determine if a single underlying model of ecological 
relations held for all informants in a population. We collapsed over the different ways in which 
one kind might help or hurt another and the dependent variable for each pair was whether the 
plant or animal in question helped, hurt, or had no effect on the other kind. Agreement across 
informants was determined by whether their answers matched or mismatched for each pair. To 
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establish consensus, all tasks involved 12 participants from each group, with equal numbers of 
males and females. Data were adjusted for guessing (Romney et al., 1986).   
Plants Affecting Animals. Each of the three groups produced a distinct model on the 
forest ecology task. Two results are apparent on how participants see plants affecting animals: 
(1) Itza' and Ladinos show a highly similar pattern of relations, and (2) Q’eqchi’ perceive many 
fewer relations, and those tend to be a subset of those seen for the other two groups. The 
overwhelming majority of interactions within each group involved plants helping animals by 
providing them food. Plants providing shelter to animals was also a common response. An 
ANOVA for plants helping animals showed that Q’eqchi’ report, on average, many fewer 
relations (46.8 = 5.8%) than either Ladinos (163.2 = 26.1%) or Itza' (187.5 = 23.1%) who did not 
differ from each other [F(2,33)=23.10,  p<.001]. There were a maximum of 812 relations. Itza’ 
and Ladinos showed a large overlap for which plants help which animals: r (I,L) = .82 versus r 
(I,Q) = .42 and  r (L,Q) = .54.  
A large cross-group consensus emerged: the first factor was 12.3 times the second and 
explained 67% of the variance. Often all Q’eqchi’ reported no effect, making the modal answer, 
“no effect.” Thus, Q’eqchi’ responses drive the overall consensus. Given this situation, residual 
analyses are more effective than simple measures of inter-informant agreement in revealing 
cultural models. We analyzed a 3 X 36 residual agreement matrix. For each of 36 informants (12 
in each group) there were three measures: average residual agreement of that informant with 
members of the same group and that informant’s average residual agreement with members of 
each of the other two groups. Within-group agreement proved reliably greater than across group 
agreement: for each group, F (2,22) > 23, p <.001.  
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At a finer level of detail we examined pairs of groups for within versus across group 
agreement. The Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ samples had greater within- than between-group residual 
agreement. The Ladino sample showed higher within- than between-group residual agreement 
vis-a-vis Q’eqchi’, but did not share more residual agreement with one another than with Itza’.  
This asymmetrical residual agreement is consistent with the idea that the Ladinos are learning 
from the Itza’.12 
One distinction between Itza' and Ladino samples was the latter’s tendency to generalize 
the beneficial effect (on animals) of economically and culturally important plants, such as 
mahagony (the prime wood export) and ceiba (Guatemala’s national tree) without apparent 
justification (Atran et al, 2002). Relations noted by Q’eqchi’ were basically subsets of those 
reported by other groups. Overall, Ladino and Itza' consensual models converge on how plants 
help animals. The Q’eqchi’ model is a severely limited subset of the Itza’ and Ladino models. 
Animals Affecting Plants. Reports of how animals affect plants yielded even larger 
differences. Q'eqchi’ nominate too few interactions (they agree on only 10 of 812 possible 
relations) for consensus analysis. Itza’ and Ladinos show strong cross-group consensus, but also 
greater residual agreement within than between groups. Negative reports of animals hurting 
plants occur with equal frequency (8.0% of cases by Itza’, 8.2% by Ladinos) the two groups. 
Strikingly, however, Itza’ are 4 times more likely to report positive interactions and 3.4 times 
more likely to report reciprocal relations (a plant and animal helping each other) as Ladinos.   
With respect to positive relations, Itza’ report that different classes of animals 
differentially affected classes of plants, whereas Ladinos do not. To illustrate, plant kinds were 
collapsed into four classes (Fruit, Grass/Herb, Palm, and Other), as were animal classes 
(Arboreal, Bird, Rummager, and Predator). An ANOVA using plant classes, animal classes and 
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interaction type (positive or negative animal-plant relations) reveals a plant by animal interaction 
for Itza' but not for Ladinos [F(9,99)=26.04, p<.0001]:13 (1) arboreals were much more likely to 
interact with fruit trees than with other plant groups, (2) birds were also most likely to interact 
with fruit trees, but also had moderate levels of interactions with palms, (3) rummagers 
interacted primarily with grasses/herbs, and to a lesser extent with fruit trees, (4) predators 
showed few if any interactions with plants.  
On a qualitative level, although both groups acknowledge that animals have a large 
impact on fruit trees, Itza’ differ from Ladinos in understanding these relations. In their 
justifications of plant-animal relationships, Ladinos almost always see animals as harming plants 
by eating fruit. Itza’ justifications reveal a more nuanced appreciation of the relationship between 
seed properties and processing: if the seed is soft and the animal cracks the fruit casing, the 
animal is likely to destroy the seed and thus harm the plant; but if the seed is hard and passes 
through the animal’s body rapidly, then the animal is apt to help the plant by dispersing and 
fertilizing the seed (Atran & Medin, 1997). 
A more detailed examination of positive and negative relations reinforces the view that 
Itza’ and Ladinos are attending to the same relations but interpreting them differently. The two 
groups have essentially the same model of negative relations---for no animal-plant pair did the 
proportion of Itza’ nominations of a negative relation differ from the corresponding Ladinos 
proportion by more than .40. For a given animal-plant pair both positive and negative relations 
could be reported. For both groups there was a reliable, positive correlation between reporting a 
positive relation for a pair and reporting a negative relation for that same pair (For Itza’, r = .62, 
p <.01; for Ladinos, r = .57, p < .01). The group difference on number of positive animal-plant 
relations is mediated by the fact that Itza’ are much more likely to report a positive relation, even 
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when a negative relation is also present. We will examine this difference in more detail when we 
consider mechanisms of cultural transmission. 
These findings suggest a complex Itza' folkecological model of the forest, wherein 
different animals affect different plants, and relations among plants and animals are reciprocal.  
On a qualitative level, the Ladinos appear to be operating under a different cultural model. In a 
preliminary interview where we asked Ladinos how animals help plants (thus presupposing that 
they do) the typical response was. “Animals don’t help plants; plants help animals.” Ladinos also 
possess a relatively elaborate model, but relations are more unidirectional and less specific. 
Q’eqchi’ acknowledge a much reduced role for plants, and almost no role for animals in the 
folkecology of the forest. 
Human Impact on Plants. For each species we asked what its value was for people, and 
what people’s effect was on the species. “Human impact” was assessed on a scale from negative 
(-1) through neutral (0) to positive (+1). For each population we simply added the individual 
responses and divided by the size of the population. Each population had sufficient statistical 
consensus among informants to warrant aggregating individual responses of the population into a 
cultural model of “impact signature’” that is, what people believe their impact is on plant species 
(Table 3). Thus, if 9 informants reported a positive impact, 1 a negative impact, the overall score 
would be eight-twelfths, or .67. Table 3 also reports the ecological centrality of the plants in the 
eyes of each population: the ecological centrality of a given plant is the proportion of plant-
animal associations in the population’s consensual ecological model for that plant (we will 
discuss the relations between ecological centrality and other factors shortly). 
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Impact signatures for Itza’ and Ladinos were moderately correlated (r= .65, p<.001), 
suggesting somewhat similar views of how members of their respective communities affect 
plants. Signatures for Q’eqchi’ were negatively correlated with those of Itza’ (r = -.28) and 
Ladinos (r = -.16), suggesting a very different model of human effects on plants. Itza’ report 
beneficial impact on all ecologically and economically important plants, and absolute 
commitment to protect ramon and chicle (Manilkara achras). Itza’ call ramon "the milpa of the 
animals" because many bird and mammal species feed on its fruits and leaves (Atran, 1993). The 
chicle tree is also visited often by animals and, as with ramon, has a long history of local use. 
Extraction of chicle latex for chewing gum was Petén’s prime cash source in the past century. 
Itza’ report variable impact on herbaceous undergrowth, strangler figs (Ficus sp., which nourish 
many animals but kill other trees), and yaxnik (Vitex gaumeri), which Itza’ see as a marginally 
useful “forest weed.” Itza’ report harmful impact on pukte (Bucida buceras), another “forest 
weed,” on kanlol (Senna racemosa), a “village weed,” and on vines cut for water and cordage. 
Ladinos also report highly positive impact for valuable plants (including the ceiba, Ceiba 
pentandra, Guatemala’s national tree). For palms, they report positive impact only for those used 
for thatch (corozo palm fruits are also sold to a local NGO). For most plants they report variable 
impact.  Q'eqchi’ report positive impact only for thatch palms, and negative impact on Petén’s 
most important cash sources: chicle, tropical cedar (Cedrela mexicana), mahogany (Swietania 
macrophylla), xate (decorative Chamaedorea dwarf palms collected for export). 
Interestingly, ramon and chicle, whose native uses the Spanish documented at the time of 
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the conquest (Landa, 1985 [1566]), are the two most frequent species encountered in northern 
Petén forests (AHG-APESA, 1992). Moreover, only the Petén variety of ramon appears to bear 
fruit any time of the year (Peters, 1989). This suggests that inter-generational patterns of care of 
ramon and chicle by Maya have produced a highly anthropogenic forest, which Itza’ continue to 
foster and tend. 
The fact that Itza’ believe (on average) that they have beneficial impact on important 
species does not logically entail or causally imply that Itza’ should choose costly conservation 
methods to protect certain trees. But it is a matter of fact that they do (see below). Given that the 
other two groups do not protect the trees that Itza’ do, Itza’ conservation may not make sense. 
The correct interpretation of Itza’ conservation is not clear. One could offer a group 
selection argument (sacrifice of individual advantage for the benefit of the group as a whole) by 
suggesting that Ladinos see the Itza’ success in the forest and (will eventually) come to adopt 
their practices. Another possibility is that the Itza’ simply have not (yet) adjusted their practices 
to take into account the behaviors of individual Q’eqchi’ and Ladinos. Later on, we suggest that 
individual actions in accordance with spiritual values may be part of the story, and that such 
values work to refine calculations of self-interest. 
Ground-truthing. Itza’ folkecological models also relate directly to observed behavior. 
Regression analysis revealed that for Itza’, ratings of human impact (the proportion of informants 
reporting their actions as helping or hurting particular species) and weed status (factoring out 
plants considered to be weeds) predicted frequencies of trees counted in informant parcels (r2 = 
.46, p = .004, with both predictors reliable). No comparable relation emerged for Ladinos or 
Q’eqchi’. Regressions also revealed different predictors of human impact on plants for each 
group. For Itza’, ecological centrality (number of associations in the group's consensual 
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ecological model for a given plant) and combined utility (value of a plant for wood, shelter and 
cash combined) predicted reported human impact (r2 = .44, p < .001, with both predictors 
reliable). In short, ecological importance and overall utility predicted which plants the Itza’ seek 
to protect, which in turn predicts the plants encountered in sample plots.  
For Ladinos, cash value was the only reliable predictor of impact, indicating that Ladinos 
protect plants having cash value. For Q'eqchi', none of these variables predicted impact signature 
and the (non-significant) correlations were consistently negative, indicating the Q’eqchi’ tend to 
destroy valuable plants. In sum, the three groups have very different mental models of the forest, 
and correspondingly distinct patterns of use. Only Itza' seem to have a positive vision of the role 
of plants, animals and humans in helping the forest to survive that is based on species 
reciprocity. For neither of the other two groups is there a reliable association between mental 
models of the forest and patterns of use.  
The Itza’ model is of considerable importance for an understanding of successful forest 
management. From a culture theory perspective it is also important to address the mental models 
of the two immigrant groups.  First, how do migrants acquire their knowledge of a new 
environment? And second, why is the Ladino model so similar to the model of the Itza’ Maya?  
Cultural Epidemiology in the Concrete.  
Social networks. Social network analysis bears out the close relationship in mental 
models and forest behaviors. For each community we began with 6 men and 6 women not 
immediately related by kinship or marriage. To ensure maximum social coverage from our 
sample, initial informants could not be immediate blood relatives (children, grandchildren, 
parents, grandparents, siblings, first cousins, nieces, nephews, uncles, aunts), affines (spouse, in-
law) or godparents (compadres). Each informant was asked to name, in order of priority, the 7 
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people outside of the household “most important for your life.” Informants were asked in what 
ways the people named in this social network were important for their lives, how often they 
interacted with these people and what kind of relation they had with them (family, work, friend, 
etc.). After the initial interviews we extended our sample size with the “snowball method” (e.g. 
we asked the 1st and 7th person of each of the 12 initial networks the same questions). When 
either the first or last person named was not available, we interviewed either second or sixth 
person named. The decision to establish network closure after just one iteration (one round) was 
based on previous studies suggesting that, in practice, it is rarely necessary to seek direct ties 
involving more than one intermediary. 
Expert networks. Some days after the eliciting the social network each informant was 
asked to name, in order of priority, the 7 people “to whom would you turn if there were 
something that you do not understand and want to find out about the forest/fishing/hunting.” 
Informants were asked about the kind of information they would seek in these expert networks.  
The three populations markedly differ in their social and expert network structures, with 
different consequences for the flow of information about the forest. First consider social 
networks, which are summarized in the graphs shown in Figure 1. The circle graph of the Ladino 
network shows a clear gender division of the community.14 The Iza’ social network is the most 
diffuse, and the two clusters correspond, not to gender but to the two major moieties (subgroups, 
often organized in terms of practices such as inter-marriage rules). The MDS that accompanies 
each circle graph in Figure 1 uses the pattern of connections as a similarity metric and scales the 
similarity relations – in this case – in a two-dimensional space (while preserving the connections 
shown in the circle graph): for the Itza’, the first dimension differentiates the two major moieties 
and the second reflects the presence of clans and families that are connected in different ways to 
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the major moieties but not each other.15 Q’eqchi’ form the most socially interconnected 
community. They show a dense, highly interconnected network, with no dominant individual or 
subgroup. The following analysis supports this impression. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________________________________________  
Lambda Sets. To measure social connectedness we used the group λ-level. Lambda Sets 
describe the line connectivity of nodes (Borgatti et al, 1990). The line connectivity for a pair of 
nodes is equal to the minimum number of lines that must be removed from the graph in order to 
leave no path between them. For our purposes, we use the group as the Lambda set and calculate 
the minimum connectivity (rather than the average) as an index of overall group cohesiveness. In 
the case of the Itza', for example, if one link is removed, then at least one member of the group 
gets separated from the group. For Ladinos, two links must be removed to separate at least one 
member from the group. For Q’eqchi’, four links must be removed to separate at least one 
member from the group. Level 5 (λ = 5) includes 90% of Q'eqchi', 21% of Ladinos and only 
10% of Itza'. In short, the Q’eqchi’ are the most and the Itza’ the least interconnected.  
The dense and interconnected social structure of the Q’eqchi’ community favors 
communal and ceremonial institutions that organize accountability, and these institutions are 
manifestly richer among Q’eqchi’ than among Itza' or Ladinos. Only Q’eqchi’ practice agro-
forestry in corporate groups: neighbors and kin clear and burn each household’s plot, kin groups 
seed together, and the community sanctions unwarranted access to family stands of copal trees 
(Protium copal) whose resin is ritually burned to ensure the harvest. This implies that 
institutional monitoring of access to resources, cooperating kin, commensal obligations, an 
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indigenous language, and knowledge of the land (including recognition of important species) 
may not suffice to avoid ruin of common-pool resources. These are some of the elements that 
Ostrom and others have identified as crucial for sustaining common pool resources. But for the 
Q’eqchi’ of Corozal, continued corporate and ceremonial ties to the sacred mountain valleys of 
the Q’eqchi’ Highlands do not carry corresponding respect for Lowland ecology. While Q’eqchi’ 
recognize the species of the area, the appear to be lacking (1) the relevant information of which 
species are important to protect and (2) values that might support respective behavior. The 
relatively closed corporate structure that channels information focused on internal needs and 
distant places likely impedes access to relevant ecological information (which species ought to 
be protected) important to commons survival.  
Relation between social and expert networks. Overall, Itza’ informants almost 
exclusively cite Itza’ as experts. Ladinos cite both Ladinos and Itza’ as experts, with Ladino 
women tending to nominate Ladino men (75% of the time) who, in turn, nominate Itza’ men the 
majority (56%) of the time. Q’eqchi’ informants cite neither Ladinos nor Itza’; strikingly, the 
two most common nominations are a Washington-based NGO and a Guatemalan governmental 
agency. The remaining Q’eqchi’ nominations overwhelmingly consist of Q’eqchi’ males. 
The greatest overlap in the social and expert networks occurs among Itza’ and the least 
among Q’eqchi’. For Itza’, 14 of the most cited social partners are among the 22 most cited 
forest experts. Although the Itza’ social network is not highly centralized, the most cited social 
partner is also the second most cited forest expert, whereas the top forest expert is also the third 
most cited social partner. For Ladinos, 11 of the most cited social partners are among the 25 
most cited forest experts. Of these 11, all are Ladino men. The top Ladino experts, in turn, most 
cite the same Itza’ experts as the Itza’ themselves do, suggesting diffusion of information from 
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Itza’ experts to a select group of socially well-connected Ladino men. For Q’eqchi’, who have by 
far the most densely connected and centralized social networks, only 6 of the most cited social 
partners are among the 18 most cited forest experts (these are cited less often as experts than 
outside institutions).  
Q’eqchi’ have lowest agreement on who the forest experts are and Itza' the highest. While 
the social network of the Q’eqchi’ might allow for speedy and repeated processing of new 
information, their expert network has two limitations. First, Q’eqchi’ seem not to have 
established links to reliable outside sources of information other than national and international 
NGO’s with whom they do not interact frequently. Second, within their community they do not 
have established and trustworthy sources of important information about the forest ecology 
(clearly identified experts). As a result, (1) there is only little chance for new information to enter 
the system and (2) what outside information there is seems unlikely to penetrate deeply into the 
Q’eqchi’ community, because it is not conveyed by socially-relevant actors (identified experts).  
For Itza’, expert information about the forest appears integrally bound to patterns of 
social life as well as to an experiential history traceable over many generations, if not millennia. 
For Ladinos, expert information is also likely to be assimilated into the community. Because 
Ladino experts (i.e., Ladinos most cited as experts by other Ladinos) are socially well-connected, 
information that may come through Itza’ experts (i.e., those Itza’ most cited as experts by other 
Itza’ as well as by Ladino experts) has access to multiple interaction pathways.    
Networks and information transmission. One possibility consistent with the Itza’ social 
and expert network structure is that ecological knowledge is directly transmitted from socially 
well-connected forest experts to other Itza’. To evaluate this possibility, we analyzed patterns of 
residual agreement in relation to social and expert network structure. We focused exclusively on 
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the nonempty cells because knowledge transmission should primarily take the form of noting an 
existing relation, not the absence of relations. Analyses within the Itza’ sample revealed little 
residual agreement and this agreement was inconsistent across different tasks. In no case could 
we discern relationships between residual agreement and social or expert network proximity. In 
other words, Itza’ social structure does not show evidence of specific pathways for learning 
about the forest, at least among our sample.  
Lack of residual agreement could largely reflect asymptotic, high repetition of 
information among all informants and the resulting high level of expertise. A related possibility 
derives from the fact that our informants were mainly Itza’ elders. They may have learned from 
their parents and grandparents and may be passing knowledge down to children, grandchildren, 
nephews and nieces but not to other elders. We are currently collecting folkecological models 
and social and expert networks across three generations of Itza’ and Ladinos and these data will 
bear more strongly on social transmission of information. 
 There also is an alternative scenario to learning about the forest that is more consistent 
with independent discovery than direct social transmission of ecological knowledge. When asked 
how they learn about the forest, Itza' mostly claim to acquire knowledge elicited in our tasks by 
“walking alone” in the forest they call “the Maya House.” For Itza', diffusely interconnected 
social and expert networks suggest multiple social pathways for individuals to gain, and for the 
community to assimilate and store, information about the forest. Such independently gained 
information might then be culturally assimilated through a similar reference framework 
providing salient interpretations and inferences (through cultural stories, values, etc.).  
Our analysis of cultural models and social transmission is frankly speculative but it does 
have testable consequences that we explore in the next section of this paper. The general idea is 
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that a person’s cultural upbringing primes attention to (1) certain observable relationships at a 
given level of complexity and (2) to connect these observations through certain inferences (e.g., 
that animals and plants have reciprocal relations). In addition, each person may be culturally-
attuned to the relevant discoveries of other individuals whose knowledge forms part of the 
emergent cultural consensus. Such emergent belief structures resemble framework theories in 
their ability to integrate various background assumptions, and to take particular experiences and 
events and give them general relevance in terms of a much larger ensemble of complexly-related 
cases (Wisniewski and Medin, 1994).   
Ladino folkecological beliefs may be at least partially parasitic on the Itza’ network in the 
following sense: whereas Itza' may observe the forest for what is important, Ladinos may 
observe, not only the forest, but also the Itza' for what is important. The Ladino network points 
to person I as the best socially-connected individual. He is also the most often cited Ladino forest 
expert and the founder of the community. When asked himself, he reported mostly Itza’ Maya as 
forest experts. This is a common feature for Ladino experts and it appears to result in systematic 
cross-cultural learning. The highest competence scores among the Ladinos in the combined Itza’-
Ladino model of plant-animal relations belong to those Ladinos who most cite Itza’ as their 
experts (Atran, et al, 2002).16 Ladino experts are also the most socially well-connected members 
of the Ladino community. Putting these findings together suggests both that Ladinos are learning 
from Itza’, and that the social and expert network structure facilitates this spread of knowledge 
between the Ladino and Itza’ communities.   
Over time, socially well-connected expert Ladinos converge towards the consensus of 
Itza’ experts, at least with respect to plants helping animals. For example, we found that 
judgments of plant-animal associations for the mostly highly-rated Ladino expert actually 
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comprised a proper subset of the judgments made by the most highly-rated Itza’ expert (details 
in Atran et al., 2002).17 It is improbable that Ladinos, who approximate Itza’ response patterns 
for hundreds of species relations, actually observe and copy what Itza’ say and think about each 
of the species pairs in question. How, then, are Ladino experts learning specific contents? And 
why do they acquire only certain aspects of the Itza’ model? 
The Learning Landscape.  
In line with evolutionary models of social learning, one may assume that, when in doubt 
or ignorance about a certain domain of activity vital to everyday life, people will look to those 
with knowledge in order to emulate them (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, Henrich & Boyd, 1998). 
Observers typically do not have direct access to the deep knowledge they wish to emulate, only 
to surface "signs" or "markers" of that knowledge. One promising strategy would be to first look 
for knowledge from those to whom deference (respect) is shown by others (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). At least in many small-scale societies, knowledge-bearers tend to be elders, 
political leaders, economically well-off, and so on. In the Itza' case, forest experts are experts in a 
variety of relevant domains (e.g., soils, trees, hunting, collecting plants), elder males, and former 
political town leaders.  
Informally we have noted that Ladinos today continue to express doubt about their forest 
knowledge and express a desire to acquire knowledge from the Itza'. Apparently, the most 
respected and socially well-connected Ladinos attend to those Itza' to whom other Itza' defer, and 
these Ladinos, in turn, become subjects of emulation and sources of knowledge for other 
Ladinos. But how do Ladinos go about obtaining the relevant knowledge without initially 
knowing how it is relevant?   
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First of all, there may be some transmission of norms or rules—we have witnessed Itza’ 
showing Ladinos how to control burns when clearing land for milpa and discussing where to 
plant different species of fruit trees.  Other learning factors may be involved in transmitting 
knowledge, including normative prototypes and narratives, but in fairly indirect ways. Thus, 
Ladino prototypes and stories of Itza’ experts as forest wizards may share little actual content 
with the normative pronouncements and narratives of the Itza’ themselves. Moreover, Itza’ 
disavow teaching the Ladinos anything about the forest. The line of reasoning that follows is 
frankly anecdotal, but one that should motivate further research.  
For present purposes of greatest relevance is evidence suggesting Ladinos may be 
acquiring knowledge through different isolated examples that trigger inferential structures to 
support generalizations. Our data suggest that two distinct forms of inference may affect mental 
models of the forest: 1. inferences from general knowledge of ecological relationships, such as 
whether relations are positive or negative and where in the forest they are likely to occur, and 2. 
category-based induction over ecological and taxonomic groups. Consider the first form of 
inference. A Ladino may observe or hear about a particular exemplar of ecological knowledge 
from a respected Itza' (perhaps embedded in a story), such as observing that Itza' elders look for 
fallen ramon fruits after spider monkeys have passed through the trees. Itza' do this because they 
know that spider monkeys like to play with and chew on ramon fruits, and then throw them onto 
the forest floor. From such a description of Itza' behavior, a Ladino observer may deduce that: (a) 
ramon is desired and useful for people, and (b) spider monkeys can affect ramon seeds. They 
might also incorrectly infer that Spider monkeys hurt the ramon tree (throwing the fruits to the 
ground), not knowing the fact (not reported in the story) that half-chewed fruits are even more 
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likely than unchewed fruits to generate new ramon stands. In short, they tend to construe 
symmetrical relations asymmetrically.   
Another form of inference is category-relatedness. Although Ladino observers seem to 
lack the Itza’ cultural bias of conceiving species relationships reciprocally, they are nevertheless 
able to spontaneously induce much more from a single instance of experience than simply (a) 
and (b).18  For example, we should expect Ladinos to generalize their observations along much 
the same lines as Itza' do when Itza’ and Ladino taxonomies coincide. In the above scenario, 
Ladinos should “automatically” infer that howler monkeys and kinkajous similarly affect ramon 
because Ladinos, like Itza’, recognize both generic species as belonging to the same intermediate 
folktaxon as the spider monkey (see López, et al, 1997). Further correspondences are predictable 
from the similarity between the two groups’ appreciations of ecological associations. For both 
groups, the ramon and chicle trees have very similar ecological profiles. Thus, both groups 
should readily generalize relations from, say, spider monkeys and ramon trees to kinkajous and 
chicle trees. Analysis of response patterns indicates that this is consistently the case.   
Given that these relationships are true, we cannot separate inference from independently 
learning these six relations. In that sense the data are asymmetrical, because the only truly 
informative data would be an uneven patterning which would undermine our suggestions about 
inferences. Nonetheless, it is striking that all six relations are close to unanimous in both groups, 
despite the diversity of experience with the forest and wide range of competence scores.  
We also have tentative evidence for a form of inference based on plausible reasoning. For 
example, in the absence of direct observation of nocturnal, furtive felines, it is plausible to 
believe that they would hide out under the protective cover of leafy fruit trees to prey upon other 
animals that feed on the fruit. Female Ladinos who seldom venture into the forest 
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overwhelmingly (75%) infer that felines seek out fruit trees. Male Ladinos (17%) and Itza’ 
(16%) know better, because they go into the forest. Because Itza’ hunt at night, they are 
generally aware (63%) that felines stalk their prey in areas of grassland and underbrush, rather 
than deep forest, whereas few Ladinos (12%) show such awareness.  
A reviewer suggested that these data may simply indicate a social learning system in 
which women are influenced by women and men by men. To evaluate this idea we conducted a 
residual analysis of the Ladino plant-animal relationships to see if residual agreement was higher 
within men and within women than across genders. It was not. Instead, we found that women 
agreed with women reliably more than men agreed with men [F(1,10) = 9.64, Mse = 3.16, p = 
.01]. We think this result reflects the stability of inference processes at the family and genus level 
on the part of women, relative to the diversity of concrete experience among Ladino men. 
A key constraint on inductive inference is the interpretation of the base event itself. In the 
above scenario, if the Ladino observer lacks a cultural propensity for conceiving of species 
relationships reciprocally, then he will neither learn that spider monkeys help ramon trees nor 
infer that kinkajous help chicle trees. In one line of followup work we have been examining 
ecological models among younger (30-50 year old), Spanish-speaking Itza’. Relative to older 
Itza’ speakers, we find considerable overlap, but also what appear to be systematic under- and 
over- generalizations for the case of animals affecting plants. In contrast to the Ladinos, the 
younger Itza’ generalize along lines of reciprocal relations and report as many positive animal-
plant relationships as the older Itza’. This suggests that the younger Itza’ retain the cultural bias 
for construing species relationships reciprocally.  
In some cases younger Itza’ over-generalizations reflect construing an asymmetrical 
relationship reciprocally as is apparently the case for younger Itza’ seeing the bat and several 
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birds as helping palms by seed dispersal. Interestingly, the younger Itza’ agree with each other 
on their overgeneralizations, suggesting that they are principled and linked to observations, even 
though, according to their elders they are incorrect.19 
In brief, individual Ladinos and younger Itza’ seem to project fragmentary observations 
of older Itza’ behavior to a richly textured cognitive model of folkecology by inference in 
addition to any effects of direct instruction, imitation, or invocation of norms (even the notion of 
“reciprocity” that we invoke to interpret Itza’ responses is only a gloss for a distributed network 
of ideas, that is, a reliable pattern of inter-informant agreement showing recognition of plants 
positively affecting animals and of animals positively affecting plants).  
These data on learning and inference are far from definitive and, in some cases, they rely 
on accepting the null hypothesis, that is, failure to find relations between social network distance 
and residual agreement. To support our speculative account and to develop and evaluate 
alternative hypotheses, we need the sort of data on social and experts networks and ecological 
models across multiple generations that we are currently collecting. At a minimum, however, we 
think we have shown that the acquisition of ecological models involves inferences and that 
cultural notions like reciprocity can guide the interpretation of observations. 
Summary. We believe that social learning involves inferential processes that are 
mobilized according to several factors: (1) domain-specific cognitive devices (e.g., taxonomy for 
biological kinds), (2) prior cultural sensitivity to certain kinds of knowledge (e.g., species 
reciprocity in ecological relationships), (3) awareness of lack of knowledge and the motivation to 
acquire it (doubt),  (4) selective attention (e.g., Itza' deference and attention to forest itself while 
Ladinos also focus on the behavior of Itza' elders), and (5) pre-existing values (weighted 
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preferences) with respect to a given cognitive domain (e.g., overvaluing economic utility relative 
to other determiners of interest, such as sacredness or role in the economy of nature, see below). 
Overall, then, Ladino knowledge is a subclass of Itza' knowledge that under-represents 
the ecological complexity of Itza' knowledge. To be sure, the Ladinos use their own taxonomic 
and ecological knowledge of the forest to generalize their inferences from Itza' behavior. From 
studies of other Ladino communities in Petén, it seems that some "Peténero" Ladino 
communities have learned to think and act much as Itza' do after three or four generations of the 
kind of contact described between our Itza' and Ladino samples (Schwartz, 1990). These 
accounts are more of an anecdotal nature and need further experimental support. On a general 
level, though, these ethnographic accounts are in line with our findings. 
Spiritual Games. 
 Anthropologists and sociologists target shared rules, or “norms,” as functional building 
blocks of cultures and societies. Economists and political scientists see norms as institutional 
means to solving public goods problems, like “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968; 
Ostrom, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995). The general idea is that to solve problems of rational choice 
inherent in balancing individual and collective needs, individuals must be made to forsake a 
measure of self-interest, and to sacrifice resources in accordance with institutional norms that 
function to maintain the public good(s). 
   Yet, evidence from our “garden experiment” neither indicates the primacy of norms in 
explaining cultural differences in regard to The Tragedy of the Commons, nor does it indicate 
that institutional mechanisms are exclusive or primary means for preserving common resources. 
Immigrant Q’eqchi’ form the most socially-interconnected, institutionally-structured community, 
but are least likely to preserve the resource base (perhaps because the community is so culturally 
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hermetic). The affective involvement of the Q’eqchi’ with the landscape of their homeland may 
resemble Itza’ involvement with Petén; but if so, little of it carries over from the Highlands to the 
Lowlands. A NGO operative sums this up quoting Q’eqchi’ Maya in the Petén:“in the mountains 
[of Cobán] we use the land with God’s permission, but not in Petén” (see Atran et al., 2002, for 
details of Highland Q’eqchi’ folkecology). 
The Itza’ community is the most socially-atomized and least institutionalized (at least in 
terms of coordinated agricultural schedules), but its individuals most clearly act to maintain the 
common environment. If neither institutionalized learning nor institutional control mechanisms 
are responsible for commons maintenance among Itza', what is? 
Values. How do people manage limited resources in a sustainable manner without 
apparent institutional constraints to encourage and monitor cooperation? Multiple factors are 
involved in explaining the stability of representations within and across our study populations. In 
our companion paper (Medin and Atran, 2004), we discuss two such factors: 1. modular 
processes that may be triggered by minimal experience (e.g. folkbiological taxonomy, presumed 
essence based on generic species and associated inference processes) and 2. ecological reasoning 
that is more sensitive to experience and more variable across groups. In addition, as noted here, 
there is evidence of other psychological biases involved in stabilization, including sensitivity to 
conformity and prestige (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Henrich and Boyd, 1998).  
We asked people from each of the three Petén groups to rank order each of 21 plant 
species in terms importance according to: (1) members of their own community, (2) & (3) 
members of each of the other two communities, (4) God, and (5) forest spirits. All three groups 
in the study believe in the existence of forest spirits, called “Arux” by the Itza’. As we will see, 
the underlying concepts of these spirits, however, differ across the communities in ways relevant 
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to our study. We looked for correlates of these rankings for each of the groups, examining 
ecological centrality, human impact, cash value and total number of uses as predictor variables.  
Only Itza’ males see the forest spirits as actively protecting the forest: their rankings from 
the point of view of the forest spirits are significantly related (r2 = .63, F = 15.5, p =.0001) to 
Itza’ reports of ecological centrality (number of associations in a group's consensual ecological 
model for a given plant) and human impact (the extent to which people report their actions as 
helping or hurting particular species). Each of these factors is reliable when their correlation with 
the other factor is partialed out. Ladinos and Q’eqchi’ state belief in forest spirits, and Ladinos 
even provide normative and narrative accounts of spirit life similar to those of Itza’. Yet, we 
found no reliable group consensus in these two populations, nor did we find reliable interactions 
between spirit preferences, human impact, ecological centrality or use for these populations. 
Finally, Itza’ rankings of God’s preferences (i.e., how Itza’ believe God rates the importance of 
each species) are related to the measure of combined use but not ecological centrality. The same 
is the case for the Ladinos and the Q’eqchi’ where god – watching out for the humans - protects 
the species most important to humans. For these two groups forest spirits appear to be an 
extension of god, supporting him by protecting the same species. 
Finally, we asked members of several local and international NGOs with over a decade of 
experience in the area to rank the same trees as did Itza' and Ladinos in terms of importance to 
forest life. The aim was to see if and how well NGO preferences correspond with ecological 
centrality, the values of the local groups, and/or metrics such as cash value. Cash value proved to 
be important and ecological centrality played no role at all. The most valued species for the 
NGOs were, in rank order: mahogany, tropical cedar, allspice and chicle. These are the most 
important trees for the extractive economy and export market. The worst predictor of NGO 
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rankings was male Itza' rankings of spirit preferences (r2 =.06) and Itza’ ratings of ecological 
centrality (r = -.229). NGO preferences partially predicted consensus on preferences expressed 
by Ladinos (r2 = .72, p < 0.01) and Itza' (r2 = .44, p < 0.05). (The Q’eqchi’ did not reach a 
consensus on preferences). In short, NGOs appear to focus more on economic development 
rather than the welfare of the forest. It is not clear whether the NGOs thought that cash value was 
the most important facet of importance or whether they simply tended to be much more familiar 
with these trees having cash value and based their judgments on familiarity. 
To date, rational-decision and game-theoretic accounts involving human use of non-
human resources generally have not considered non-human resources (e.g., the forest) and 
humans both as “players” in the same game, presumably because natural resources are assumed 
not to have motives, desires, beliefs, or strategies for cooperation or deception that would be 
sensitive, and systematically responsive to, corresponding aspects of human intention. There is 
work in which decision makers take into account population dynamics of exploited populations, 
but, to our knowledge, essentially no work suggesting that these resources are interacting agents 
intentionally providing rewards and punishments for decision maker behaviors.  
Of course, it is always possible to build game-theoretic models in which humans and 
non-humans interact with mutual intentionality (e.g., domestication of dogs) or in which none of 
the actors have intentions (e.g., bacteria and their hosts). However, our data suggest that people’s 
conceptualization of resources may make a difference in how they play the game.  For example, 
people’s agroforestry behavior may differ as a function of whether they consider the forest to be 
a passive object or an actor that intentionally responds to their actions. Indeed, one claim for 
“animistic” and “anthropomorphic” interpretations of species in many small-scale societies is 
that the “intention gap” between humans and species is thus bridged (at least to human 
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satisfaction) with outcomes mutually beneficial to the survival of species and of the human 
groups that live off of those species (cf. Bird-David, 1999). 
In informal interviews and conversations Itza’ men and women express the belief that 
they will be punished if they violate spirit preferences. It is important to note that this 
punishment is not carried out by humans and no human-based sanctioning system is in place to 
enforce compliance with the spirits’ rules. Therefore, the Itza’ forest spirits (Arux) cannot be 
understood as a social institution, even though the concept of Arux is socially constructed. 
Especially for men, the spirits are intermediaries or "spokesmen" for the forest species. This has 
intriguing implications for ecological decision theory and game theory in that individual Itza’ 
may be basing their cognitive and behavioral strategies for sustaining the forest more by playing 
a game (i.e., negotiating costs and benefits of mutual cooperation) with spirits than by playing a 
game with other people (on the wider role of spirits in Itza’ life and religion, see Atran, 2001b).  
From a long-term perspective, Itza’ spirit preferences may represent the statistical 
summary of mutually beneficial outcomes over generations of human-species interactions. Note 
that, as noted by Hardin (1968) evolution itself provides mechanisms for interactive “games” that 
commensurate the apparently incommensurable (e.g. “strategies” of bacteria and their hosts), and 
so may human minds (semantically rather than biologically) in ways consistent with maintaining 
absolute or asymptotic respect for sacred or “taboo” values – moral beliefs - basic to long-term 
survival and quality of life (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, Medin, Schwartz, Blok, and Birnbaum, 1999; 
see also Tanner and Medin, 2004; Atran & Norenzayan, in press).20 
 No doubt economic rationality and institutional constraints are important factors in 
determining and describing actions upon common-pool resources, but they may not suffice. 
There also appears to be an important cognitive dimension to behavioral research on how people 
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learn to manage environmental resources. Valuation studies raise the possibility that cognition of 
supernatural agents may serve not only to guarantee trust and foster cooperation between non-
kin, as standard commitment theories assume (Frank, 1988, Irons, 1996), but also foster human 
interaction with nonhuman resources in relations of “indirect reciprocity” (Alexander, 1987). 
Summary. It’s no surprise that native Maya with centuries-old dependence on a particular habitat 
have a richer model of forest ecology than immigrants. But longevity in a given context does not 
guarantee sustainable agro-forestry practices. Our observations suggest that Itza’ have a complex 
of knowledge, practices and beliefs that is associated with sustainability. One should be very 
cautious in moving from correlations to cause---we do not know whether any one component of 
the Itza’ belief system is either necessary or sufficient to support Itza’ practices. Given that 
important proviso, the extent to which knowledge, values, and beliefs about the forest spirits 
reinforce each other is remarkable. 
 It is also surprising is that Ladino immigrants who share no evident tradition with native 
Maya come to measurably resemble them in thought and action. Network analyses reveal reliable 
but non-institutionalized linkages that allow socially well-connected Ladinos access to Itza' 
forest expertise. We speculate that the highest overlap, or “fidelity,” among individual patterns 
may stem, in part, from inference based on individual exposure to role models.   
These results also have clear implications for cultural models and the study of cultural 
processes. Our program of research would barely have gotten off the ground if we were 
constrained to consider culture as an independent variable. In that framework we would have 
noted that Itza’ know more about the forest and are more likely to protect it than the Ladinos and 
Q’eqchi’. But we would have failed to attend to: 1. evidence strongly suggesting that Ladinos are 
learning from the Itza’ (based on residual agreement patterns and the link between competence 
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scores and distance from Itza’ experts), 2. evidence for two forms of inferential learning 
(plausible and category-based inference) as an alternative to an accumulation of facts, 3. 
evidence that reliance on plausible inference varies within and across cultural groups, 4. 
evidence of gender differences among Itza’ in the perceived role of the forest spirits, and 5. 
evidence that cross-group (from Itza’ to Ladinos) and cross-generational transmission of 
knowledge of the forest takes strikingly different forms. In short, the distributional view of 
culture made our work possible and, to the extent our work represents progress, it reinforces the 
distributional approach (as well as related approaches that treat variability as signal rather than 
noise). We turn now to observations that further reinforce this view. 
Further observations from Mesoamerica and North America. 
So far we have focused on a single case study – or “garden experiment” - in Petén. 
Several outstanding issues remain. For example, to what extent are our methods and theoretical 
approach generalizable to other populations and settings? To what extent are our findings about 
differences in populations that live off the same habitat the result of transgenerational differences 
in exposure and experience (e.g. recent immigrant versus long-standing settler populations) or 
the result of enduringly different mental models? 
To address these and related issues, we have used the same techniques to monitor 
ecological cognition and social networks for Highland Q’eqchi’ Maya (Aldea Paapa, Alta 
Verapaz, Guatemala), Yukatek Maya (Xk’opchen) and Ladinos (Xkomha) in Quintana Roo 
(Mexico), among Lacandon Maya (Ross 2001; 2002) in Chiapas (Mexico), and among Native 
American Menominee and majority-culture rural groups along the Wolf River in Wisconsin 
(Medin et al., 2002).  
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Highland Q’eqchi’. One open issue is whether Q’eqchi’ immigrants arrive in Petén with a 
cognitive model that is already impoverished with respect to knowledge of species relationships 
or whether they are simply unable to use richer Highland models because these are inappropriate 
to Lowland ecology (only a modest subset of species from the two settings overlap). Several 
hypothetical scenarios are possible. (1) Highland Q’eqchi’ may show impoverished models 
similar to Lowland Q’eqchi’. Multiple reasons could underlie such a finding, including the 
impact of a largely deforested Highland area. (2) Lowland Q’eqchi’ show significantly less 
complex ecological models than their peers in the highlands, who parallel the Itza’ in some 
respects. Again, potential causes include the novel ecology in which Lowland Q’eqchi’ as well 
as social processes that led to the migration of a specific group of Q’eqchi’ Maya to the lowlands 
(migrants are not a random sample of individuals from a community.)   Nonetheless, preliminary 
findings provide some useful information concerning the relation between Highland and 
Lowland Q’eqchi’ understanding of forest ecology.   
As with the Petén groups, Highland Q'eqchi' view plants as positively affecting animals, 
first by providing food and second by furnishing shelter. Consensus on positive plant-animal 
relations is marginal (ratio of eigenvalue 1:2 = 3.0, variance = 44%). Nearly 20% of all possible 
plant-animal relations are positive. Although the differing species in the two locales undermine 
any direct comparisons the 20% figure is comparable to that seen for Itza’ and Ladinos and 
higher than that seen for immigrant Lowland Q’eqchi’. Highland Q’eqchi’ report more negative 
animal-plant relations that their Lowland counterparts (2.3%) but fewer than Itza’ or Ladinos 
(about 8%). Continuing to bear in mind noncomparable species in the two settings, Highland 
Q’eqchi’ report less than 1% positive animal plant relations which is somewhat lower than 
Ladinos (2.1%) and far lower than Itza’ (8.2). Overall, Highland Q’eqchi’ seem to have a finer 
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appreciation of the local ecology in their Highland homeland but this knowledge is substantially 
less rich than that of Lowland Itza’ and, at best, comparable to that of the immigrant Ladinos.  
Highland Q’eqchi’ show good consensus on how humans negatively affect plants (ratio 
of eigenvalue 1:2 = 7.7, variance = 75%) but no consensus on how humans positively affect 
plants. Measures of human impact and use confirm this pattern in content-specific ways. 
Regression analyses show that food value and ecological centrality predict Highland Q'eqchi' 
reports of human impact (r 2 = .58, both predictors p =.06). Food value and impact are positively 
correlated, that is, Highland Q'eqechi' tend to protect food plants. By contrast, ecological 
centrality and impact are negatively correlated, as are ecological centrality and food value. 
Highland Q'eqchi' do not consider food plants to be ecologically important, and do not protect 
plants that they consider to be ecologically important. The main correlate of ecological 
importance plant use for firewood (r2  = .54). Firewood and cash sale (as for Lowland Q’eqchi’ 
immigrants) are arguably the least productive categories in terms of forest regeneration. Cash 
sale of important plants is not part of a local system of production, but is driven by an “extractive 
economy” that depends mostly on demand from outside markets, some even outside the region. 
Altogether it appears that Highland Q'eqchi' models of species relations are relatively 
impoverished compared to existing Itza’ models in the Petén and hence one might argue that 
immigrant Q’eqchi’ brought with them a lack of concern with maintaining forest biodiversity. 
Our findings among Lowland Q’eqchi’ are supported by similar observations in other 
communities in the Petén and adjacent areas of Belize (Carter 1969, Fagan 2000). Some of these 
notions may be tied to spirual values and emotions relating the Itza’ Maya (but not the Q’eqchi’) 
to the landscape of Petén.  For example, when environmentally-related economic difficulties 
arise (e.g., banana blight, hurricanes, etc.), immigrant leaders may send delegations to sacred 
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places in the Q'eqchi' Highlands to seek aid and redress from Highland spirits (cf. Schackt 1984). 
But our immigrant Q'eqchi' do not concern themselves with Lowland spirits or consult Itza'.  
Although these observations are preliminary, it appears that migration and the subsequent 
displacement of individuals affects the relation these people have with their immediate habitat. 
Lowland Q’eqchi’ Maya have arguably much stronger religious ties to their gods than Itza’ Maya 
have. Yet their gods are in the Highlands. As a consequence, sacred values, per se, are not 
sufficient for sustainability. We are currently exploring these issues with cross-generational 
studies with the Petén populations, as well as with Lacandon Maya – to which we now turn.  
Lacandon Maya. Our studies with the Lacandon Maya were mainly concerned with 
intergenerational change among the men of the two adult generations living in the community of 
Mensäbäk. The rationale for this focus was twofold. First, given the distributional view of 
culture, we might explore within-culture differences that go beyond expertise effects. Second, 
within-culture differences among Lacandon Maya hold particular interest. Members of the 
second generation of married adults were born or grew up in village-like communities, whereas 
fathers and grandfathers originated from dispersed households and settlements. 
To elicit mental models of folkecology, freelisting was used to generate a tally of species 
“most important for the forest to live.” The CCM produced a single factor solution (eigenvalue 
1:2 = 16.4, variance 87%), indicating a single underlying model shared by all informants. 
Nevertheless, members of the two adult generations separate on both their first and second factor 
loadings, further suggesting two submodels for the members of the two generations.  
One difference is that members of the first generation report significantly more 
interactions than members of the second generation. The first generation’s consensual model 
exhibits a clear structure that separates the animals and plants along lines of taxonomy and 
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habitat (Ross, 2001; 2002). This separation is based on specific plant-animal relations that 
involve certain physiological characteristics, such as having a hard shell (as we found with Itza’). 
We used the expert networks to explore possible links between relation to an expert and 
levels of agreement. Second-generation adults clearly regard first-generation adults as experts; 
however, we could find no evidence for a relation between proximity to an expert and ecological 
knowledge. In addition we failed to find reliable residual agreement between fathers and sons. 
As a whole, these data only describe expertise differences among the members of the Lacandon 
community. The differences appear to reflect a marked shift in recent history: namely, a dramatic 
change in settlement patterns that distanced the younger generation from forest life. The 
expertise differences observed cannot be easily explained as differences in amount of factual 
knowledge. Rather, differences in perceived goals (the need to tend the forest) and learning 
landscape (like Itza’, Lacandon elders say that one learns by “walking alone” in the forest) lead 
individuals to draw different conclusions from the same observations.  
Other research suggests that overall patterns of knowledge and behavior among native 
Lacandon Maya versus Tzeltal and Tzotzil Maya (born to immigrant families from the Highlands 
that had settled into the area) resembles that of Itza’ to Q’eqchi’ immigrants (Nigh, 2002). The 
fact that these descendants of immigrants have lived all their lives in the forest indicates that 
mere personal exposure to the local ecology is not a deciding factor.  
Finally, we turn to observations from Wisconsin. Here, cultural differences in mental 
models of nature appear to lead to misperceptions of values and inter-group conflict.  
Wisconsin Studies. The research in Wisconsin addresses the generalizability of our 
approach across different population settings, and the issue of the extent to which cultural 
differences depend on historically shallow (recent immigration) versus deep (transgenerational) 
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exposure and experience in the area. As was noted earlier, both Wisconsin populations have co-
existed in this area for at least a century and a half (first “contact” goes back another 150 years).  
The Wisconsin studies concern fishing and hunting rather than agro-forestry but the theoretical 
question is the same: Are there distinct conceptualizations of nature that underlie the Menominee 
tradition of sustainable forestry (e.g., Hall and Pecore, 1995), healthy rivers and lakes and 
abundant fish and game (Schmidt, 1995)? Do cultural differences in these conceptualization 
affect practices and inter-group perception? Results to date are most extensive for fish and 
fishing, but preliminary observations strongly suggest the same patterns for hunting.   
We sought to avoid confounding culture with expertise by focusing on experts in each 
group. Expertise was based on peer nomination and later verified by a task assessing familiarity 
with 46 local species of fish. In other work we have asked for nominations of experienced but 
less expert fishermen (Medin et al, 2002), and our experts show reliably greater familiarity with 
local fish than fishermen nominated as less expert.  
Our initial studies showed that expert Menominee fishermen are more likely to sort 
ecologically than expert majority culture fishermen. Using the procedure we described earlier, 
experts were asked to sort 44 local species of fish into groups and then to lump and split groups 
to produce a hierarchical taxonomy. We then correlated sorting distance across informants and 
conducted an overall consensus analysis. We found a clear consensus (ratio of 1st to 2nd factor = 
7.6:1, first factor accounts for 57% of the variance, mean first factor score = .75). In addition, 
residual analysis revealed that Menominee experts showed reliably greater within than across 
group agreement (the interaction of population by within versus between agreement was reliable 
[F(1,30) = 8.32, p < 0.01]). The consensual fish-fish distances for each group were used in a 
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) analysis. The MDS for the Menominee data required three 
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dimensions to obtain a good fit compared with two dimensions for majority culture experts. 
Further exploration showed that the first factor in the Menominee  MDS correlated reliably (r 
=0.72, p < 0.01) with characteristic habitat. No such dimension emerged for majority culture 
experts. Both groups shared dimensions that correlated with size and desirability (though 
characteristic adult size is fairly well correlated with taxonomic similarity and no expert 
mentioned size as a basis for categorization). In addition, sorting justifications revealed that 
Menominee were significantly more likely to provide an ecological justification as part of their 
initial sorting (40% versus 6%, F[1,30] = 18.7, p < 0.0001). These findings encouraged us to 
directly probe folkecological models (Medin et al, 2002, in press). 
In the first follow-up study, we explored perceptions of species interactions. On many 
grounds one would not expect group differences in perceived fish-fish interactions. First of all, 
informants from both groups engage in essentially the same activities in terms of when, for what, 
and how they fish. Second, activities associated with fishing are intimately intertwined with fish-
fish interactions. To be successful in fishing, one needs to know where fish are found and what 
they are eating. Food chains are an important component of fish-fish interactions. Third, our 
informants were experts who had fished, on average, for several decades, and one might expect a 
convergence of knowledge, especially when that knowledge is relevant to certain activities. 
  Twenty-one familiar species were selected and represented on name cards. The 
experimenter randomly picked one fish as a base-card and compared it with every other species 
(presented in random order). For each informant, this procedure yielded 420 potential fish-fish 
relationships. For each fish-fish pair, the informant was asked if the base species affects the 
target species and vice versa (e.g., “Does the northern affect the river shiner?” and “Does the 
river shiner affect the northern?”).  Informants were then asked whether the species affect each 
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other in other ways. Responses were coded into 19 categories such as A eats B, A eats the spawn 
of B, A helps clean the bottom that helps B when it spawns, and so forth. Food-chain relations 
(A eats B) comprised the most frequent response.  
The CCM was used to probe for a single, general cross-group model for fish-fish 
interactions, as well as for each group's particular cultural model. Four different CCMs were run 
corresponding to different criteria for agreement. Agreement was assessed on four levels: (1) 
both informants reported some kind of relation (no matter what the specific relation was), (2) 
both agreed on either a positive or a negative relation (no matter what the specific relation was), 
(3) both agreed on a food-chain relation and (4) both agreed on a reciprocal relation (no matter 
what the specific relations were). The first two CCMs looked at different criteria for agreement, 
with the second being more restrictive (if one informant said that black suckers help northerns 
(by being a food source) and another said that black suckers hurt northerns (because they eat 
their eggs), they would be coded as agreeing by the first criterion and as disagreeing by the 
second criterion.  The second two analyses looked only at specific types of relations.  For 
example, if one informant said only that northerns eat black suckers and another said that 
northerns eat black suckers and that black suckers eat the eggs of northerns, then by analysis (3) 
they would agree on one food chain relation (northerns eating black suckers) and disagree on the 
other one. In this sample example, for analysis (4) the two informants would be coded as 
disagreeing because only the second informant see the relation as reciprocal.   
  Separate CCM’s were also performed both on raw agreement and on the agreement 
adjusted for guessing. In each case, we found consensus for the combined meta-cultural model as 
well as for separate cultural models on three levels: (1) existence of a relation, (2) helping / 
hurting relations, and (3) food chain relations.21 Menominee show above chance agreement for 
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the reciprocal relations: 69% of the agreement pairs are positive (by chance, half should be 
positive). Cross-group agreement is very close to chance (48% of agreements).  
For all relations cited by at least 70% of the members of one group, we further find that: 
(1) 85 % are reported by both groups; (2) 14% (45 relations) are reported by Menominee but not 
majority culture; and (3) 1% (4 relations) are reported by majority-culture but not Menominee 
experts. Overall, Menominee report reliably more relations than their majority-culture 
counterparts (62% vs. 46% of possible relations). In short, the majority-culture ecological model 
appears to be subset of the Menominee model, a finding that parallels our results from the sorting 
task as well as the Itza’-Ladino comparison on the forest ecology task. As we shall see shortly, 
however, this difference is not a difference in the knowledge between the two groups.  
On a more specific level, Menominee experts report significantly more positive relations 
(one species helping another) than their majority culture counterparts do while members of both 
groups mention about the same number of negative relations.  The groups also differ 
substantially with respect to reciprocal relations. On average, Menominee informants mention 
59.5 reciprocal relations compared to 34.6 for majority-culture fish experts. Majority-culture 
experts differ from their Menominee counterparts in that they are likely to report the prototypical 
adult-species relation (e.g., majority culture experts are likely to report that northerns eat 
walleyes and not mention that a large walleye may eat a small northern).  
         The two cultural groups share a substantial amount of knowledge of species interactions, as 
indexed by this task. This should come as no surprise. Much of expert knowledge stems from 
actual observation while looking for fish, fishing, and even from cleaning the catch (e.g. stomach 
contents usually tell what the fish had been eating recently). However, the task also reveals clear 
cultural differences in the models of the individuals. These differences may be caused by the fact 
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that the responses of majority culture informants concerning ecological relations seemed to be 
filtered through a goal-related framework. Goals may influence reports of ecological relations in 
at least two ways. One is to focus on ecological relations that apply to adult fish rather than those 
associated with the entire life cycle. Indeed, many of the relations reported by Menominee 
experts but not majority culture experts involve spawn, fry, or immature fish.  
             A second difference is that relations present in pursuing goals may be “over-generalized” 
in the sense that they may be reported where they do not apply. Majority culture experts tend to 
report baitfish being affected by predator fish, even when the particular baitfish and predator 
tend not to be found in the same waters. Other than these few over-generalizations, the 
nominated relations appear to be accurate. 
 These two observations suggest that some differences are more the effect of “habits of the 
mind” - higher saliency or accessibility of some knowledge over other knowledge. The original 
task took 1 to 1.5 hours. Given that the informants had to report on 420 possible relations, the 
task had a rapid pace. This may have led to a difference in reported relations as a function of 
differences in knowledge accessibility. If so, we might expect that the cultural differences in 
ecological knowledge would disappear if we used an unspeeded task directly probing for 
ecological information. In one additional experiment, we asked the experts to sort local fish 
species according to where they are found and indeed the cultural differences were absent.  
 In a second follow-up experiment we probed a subset of the fish-fish interactions and 
proceeded at a considerably slower pace. Again the group differences disappeared and the main 
effect of the slower pace was that it led the majority culture experts to be much more likely to 
mention relations involving immature fish and to be more likely to mention reciprocal relations 
(Medin, et al, in press). In short, both groups share essentially the same model and knowledge 
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base but there appear to be clear cultural differences in how this knowledge is organized. 
Knowledge organization, in turn, affects what is salient or “easy to think.”  These results also 
undermine the idea that the differences in the faster-paced ecological task reflect differences in 
being eager to please the experimenter---if that were the case, then the slower pace should have 
worked to amplify, not diminish differences. 
We have also begun to examine folkbiological models in less expert Menominee and 
majority culture populations. Results from our initial sorting task reveal an interesting picture of 
explanations given for sorting. Like Menominee experts, Menominee non-experts tended to give 
relatively more ecological justifications (40%), and fewer goal-related (29%) and taxonomic-
morphological (31%) justifications. The majority-culture non-experts, by contrast, gave fewer 
ecological justifications (16%) and more goal-related (43%) and taxonomic-morphological 
(41%) justifications. Whereas the pattern of Menominee justifications is robust across the two 
levels of expertise, the majority-culture pattern changes, such that, with expertise, majority-
culture informants come to give more taxonomic-morphological and fewer ecological and goal-
related justifications. Some majority culture experts explicitly mentioned how their orientation 
towards fishing had changed over the years, moving away from the stereotypic sportsman’s 
model that targets fishing contests or going for the “trophy-fish.”    
 Inter-group perception. The above group differences in goals and ways of 
conceptualizing fish appear to have significant consequences for inter-group perception and 
conflict. In related work we have asked Menominee and majority culture experts to 1. rank order 
the importance of 15 species of fish to themselves, 2. rank order six goals associated with 
fishing, and 3. give approval or disapproval ratings for a variety of fishing practices (e.g. taking 
more than one’s limit, keeping undersized fish, fishing on spawning beds, etc). In a later 
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interview we asked these experts to perform these tasks again, first indicating how they think 
equally expert fishermen from their own community might answer them and second, indicating 
how equally expert fishermen from the other community might answer them. 
 Overall, the two groups were remarkably accurate at predicting how the other group 
would rank order the importance of the 15 species. For example, Menominee fishermen place 
greater importance on trout and lesser importance on trophy-type fish (e.g. musky) and both 
groups are aware of this. In addition, Menominee fishermen place greater priority on fishing for 
food and both sets of experts corrected predicted this difference in goals.   
 With respect to practices, there were several cultural differences in patterns of approval 
and disapproval but they paled in comparison to perceived differences. This difference between 
perception and reality was almost exclusively concentrated in majority culture perceptions of 
Menominees. Majority culture experts thought that Menominee experts would approve of every 
practice that was roundly condemned by both groups. This even included the practice of going to 
areas where sturgeon are spawning in the spring and pretending to fish for other fish in hopes of 
getting a sturgeon on the line (sturgeon are a protected species and it is illegal to use hook and 
line to catch them). Individual Menominee experts are more disapproving of this practice than 
are majority culture fishermen; majority culture fishermen made the opposite judgment. This is a 
striking difference, especially given that the sturgeon is considered to be sacred for many 
Menominee, who would likely find the above practice disrespectful. We think that some majority 
culture experts knew that Menominee value the sturgeon but inferred majority culture goals 
(wanting to wrestle with a big fish) to Menominees as the underlying reason for this valuation. 
 This misperception of Menominee attitudes, values and practices was large, but not 
uniform. In keeping with the distributed view of culture and cultural processes, we have explored 
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correlates of stereotyping or misperception. One correlate is majority culture expert sorting 
strategies. Majority culture experts who produced goal-related sorts, such as creating a category 
of undesirable fish, showed stronger stereotyping; experts who created an ecological category, 
showed less stereotyping. There was also a strong and reliable correlation between knowing that 
Menominees attach relatively higher priority on trout and the absence of stereotyping. This may 
be a proxy for degree of contact with Menominee fishermen and we are investigating this 
possibility further by collecting social and expert network data with a focus on inter-group 
linkages. Overall, these data show that behaviors and stated goals are not transparent in the case 
of inter-group perceptions. The same behavior can have very different meanings in alternative 
cultural frameworks and the resultant misunderstandings can produce inter-group conflict over 
resources (see Nespor, 2002, for a dramatic illustration of this point for the case of Native 
American fishing rights).  
 Summary. These studies reinforce the distributional view of culture. Residual analysis 
indicated that expert Menominee and majority-culture fishermen have a shared model but that, in 
addition, Menominee fishermen have a distinct model based on salience of ecological relations. 
These differences, coupled with differences in underlying subordinate goals, can give rise to 
dramatic inter-group misperception, even when both groups share the same super-ordinate goal 
of resource conservation. The interaction of culture and expertise in the basis for sorting also 
suggests different developmental trajectories in the two groups. In fact, we have other 
developmental data showing parallel cultural differences in sensitivity to ecological relations in 
young Menominee and majority culture children (Ross et al., 2003). These trajectories invite 
further analysis. 
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 Our data show that expertise cannot be separated from cultural milieu, even when people 
engage in more or less the same activities.  In that respect, cultural paths (in the sense of reliable 
distributions of conceptual representations in a population of minds) appear to provide something 
of a framework theory for organizing experience. This is seen, for example, in the Itza’ Maya 
tendency to see reciprocal relations (animals helping plants as well as being helped by them) and 
in Menominee fishermen’s ecological orientation. The parallels between the Itza’ and 
Menominee are striking, especially when one notes that both groups also have sustainable 
forestry practices.   As with Itza’ and Lacandon, some Menominee men express the belief that if 
a person treats nature in a greedy or wasteful manner then spirits will punish them, and offer 
tobacco as a prayer of thanks. 
VI. General Discussion and Implications 
Implications for Theories of Decision Making. In the area of decision making and the 
commons, the prevailing view – at least in economics and political science- has been that human 
behavior in society is driven by self-interest, mitigated by institutional constraints. Like models 
of induction that rely on universal similarity, abstract decision models employ a homogeneous 
notion of utility, where content biases and protected values simply are annoying. For example, 
protected values are annoying because their “utility” may be hard to measure or to place on a 
common scale (Baron and Spranca, 1997; Ritov and Kahneman, 1997). Content biases only 
serve to distort rational calculations of utility (but see Tanner and Medin, 2004, for a contrasting 
view). 
 Thus, analyses of the commons problem may appear to be trapped somewhere between 
isolated individual interests which lead inevitably to commons destruction and a focus on 
institutions that has little need for cognitive science. To be sure, there is a good body of social 
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science research that identifies certain conditions for cooperation in artificial experimental 
situations (e.g. Messick and Brewer, 1986, Ostrom, 1998) but it is hard to see how to transfer 
these findings to complex, real world situations such as we find in Petén and Wisconsin. 
Furthermore, this body of research provides no role for content or values other than in terms of 
fungible (transparently interchangeable) gains and losses. There is no place for absolute or sacred 
human values (Rappaport, 1979), distinct kinds of concerns (see Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2001, 
for a nice counterexample), or for calculating the “interests” of nature (Wilson, 1992). 
 We find that content-structuring mental models are pertinent to environmental decision 
making. They not only predict behavioral tendencies and stated values, but also correlate reliably 
with the measurable consequences of those behaviors and values – even down to the level of soil 
composition and the number and variety of trees found on people’s land (Atran et al, 1999, 
2002). Perhaps most strikingly, Itza’ construal of the value of a forest species as relational and 
subjectively-defined seems to recognize nature as a player with a stake in its own future. This is 
a different way people have of going about their business, and their environments may be the 
better for it. We think this sort of analysis opens the possibility of making models of decision 
processes more insightful for understanding human-environment interactions. 
Methodologies for Modeling Culture. We have presented a view of cultures as comprised 
of causally-distributed networks of mental representations, their public expressions (e.g., 
artifacts, languages, dances, etc.) and resultant behaviors in given ecological contexts. Ideas and 
behaviors become “cultural” to the extent that they endure among a given population. Just as it 
was (and still is) difficult for biology to discard the essentialized notion of species in favor of 
species as a historical, logical individual (Ghiselin, 1981), it is difficult to abandon the common-
sense notion of culture as an essentialized body (of rules, norms, and practices). In biology, it 
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makes no sense to talk about species as anything other than more or less regular patterns of 
variation among historically-related individuals. Neither can one delimit species independently 
of other species. So, too, it makes little sense to study cultures apart from patterns of variation. 
Although we employed commonsense notions of culture in setting up comparisons of 
“Itza’,” versus “Ladinos,” versus “Q’eqchi’,” our analyses indicate the extent to which these 
commonsense constructs represent statistically reliable distributions of cognitions and behaviors. 
Social network analyses further reveal that members of each of these communities almost never 
include people identified with other communities among their intimate social relations  These 
commonsense cultural constructs allowed us initially, if roughly, to distinguish populations that 
subsequently revealed themselves to consist of reliably distinct cognitive, behavioral and social-
relational patterns.   
Our use of the commonsense notion of culture to initially distinguish populations is not a 
case of circular reasoning, because patterns of similarities and differences within and between 
populations could not be predicted in advance. As with Darwin’s use of the commonsense notion 
of species, which first focused his attention, subsequent discoveries revealed only rough 
correspondence between the commonsense construct (species) and historically contingent 
patterns of evolution (more or less geographically isolated and interbreeding populations). 
Darwin continued to use the commonsense idea of “species” (Wallace, 1889:1), only as a 
heuristic notion that could ground attention as diverse and often inconclusive scientific analyses 
advanced, while denying it any special ontological status or reality (Atran, 1999).  
Likewise, intuitions about what constitutes a “culture” may continue to help orient 
research, but should not be mistaken for a final or correct framework of explanation. Thus, 
although our findings reinforce separating the Q’eqchi’ from the other groups, our findings also 
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strongly suggest that Itza’ and Ladino populations are beginning to merge on a number of 
dimensions (male expertise, residential proximity, converging use of Spanish as the principal 
language, etc.). In fact, researchers in the area from several disciplines now refer to a more 
generalized “Petenero culture” that joins Itza’ and Ladinos but still generally excludes the 
Q’eqchi’ (Schwartz, 1990). This somewhat anecdotal evidence needs to be substantiated with 
systematic observations. 
 Like modern biology, the distributional view of cultural phenomena does not take individual 
variation as deviation but as a core object of study. From this perspective, issues of cultural 
acquisition, cultural transmission, cultural formation and cultural transformation are intricately 
interwoven and, together, constitute the object of study (see also Ross, 2004). We have also seen 
how the cultural consensus model (Romney et al, 1986) can be a valuable tool for analyzing 
patterns of relative agreement and disagreement within and across populations. In addition, social 
network analysis provided the means to examine likely pathways for learning and communicating 
information. Together, consensus modeling and network analysis enabled us to systematically 
explore the aforementioned issues in an integrated fashion. 
 To illustrate, consider again our Itza’ and Ladino study populations. First of all, somewhat to 
our surprise, we could not reject the possibility that the consensual ecological model of the Itza’-
speaking elders was based on a series of independent discoveries. We found no reliable residual 
agreement that could be traced through either social or expert networks. We know that this finding 
does not owe to the insensitivity of our measures because these same networks revealed evidence 
that Ladinos were learning from Itza’. Our analyses suggest that the relevant conceptual biases for 
acquiring reciprocal understanding of species relationships are diffused throughout Itza’ networks 
(extending, as we also saw, to younger Itza’). In this sense, “reciprocity” pervades Itza’ “culture.” 
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 The Ladino settlement of La Nueva did not begin as a “culture” in any sense: it was founded 
by nuclear families stemming from scattered towns and villages with no apparent historical 
connections among them. Today, at least with respect to models of nature, Ladinos are forming 
patterns of cultural consensus, by assimilating ecologically-relevant information over expert and 
social networks, over- and under-generalizing that information in conformity with their taxonomies, 
and interpreting information in accordance with their own conceptual biases (e.g., non-reciprocity). 
In other words the Ladinos are forming their unique cultural understanding of the forest, 
transforming (with varying fidelity) Itza’ cultural models into their own.  
VII. Conclusion: A General Approach to the Study of Culture and Cognition. 
In this paper, we have argued that an effective way to the study culture and cultural proceses 
is through the study of variation within and across populations. From the theoretical perspective of 
decision theory, our work extends the tragedy of the commons to situations involving multiple 
groups transmitting knowledge and beliefs systems in distinct patterns that can be traced to 
historically-conditioned conceptions of nature and social and expert network distance. This same 
perspective is also relevant to application: cultural cognitions affect environmental values, decision 
making and prospects for human survival under conditions of global change (Atran et al., 2004). 
Our work casts a different light on the tragedy of the commons and associated game-
theoretic analyses. First, individual cognitions or mental models of resources are not irrelevant to 
environmental decision making as assumed by content-free framing in terms of utilities. A 
related observation is that the Itza’ consider the ecologically-central ramon tree to be sacred and 
always worthy of protection and unlike the other two groups would never use ramon as firewood. 
We have already noted that research in the psychology of decision making sometimes views 
sacred or protected values as a hindrance to proper decision and a source of cognitive biases 
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(e.g., Baron and Spranca, 1997). There is, however, other evidence suggesting that protected 
values may be associated with the absence of framing effects and related biases 
(Fetherstonhaugh, et al., 1997; Friedrich, et al., 1999; Tanner and Medin, 2004). Second, 
differing conceptions of a common resource may require different abstract analyses, as we saw 
in the case of the Itza’ belief in the forest spirits as guardians of the forest. In short, our unified 
approach to culture and cognition can inform - and indeed transform - models of cultural 
cognition, such as environmental decision making. 
This paper on “The Cultural Mind,” together with our companion paper on “The Native 
Mind,” reviews a decade long project on human conceptions and dealings with respect to nature 
that has naturally branched in several directions. Despite this complexity, the overall project 
nicely illustrates a unified framework for studying culture and cognition. In our companion 
paper, we focus on the role of a folkbiology module in stabilization of folkbiological knowledge. 
In the present paper, we found that folkbiological knowledge is only one of a number of key 
ingredients in the cultural stabilization of folkecological knowledge and practice.  
Our previous work on category-based induction enabled us to identify inferential patterns 
in acquisition and transfer of folkbiological knowledge. We saw that these patterns reflect both 
universal constraints on biological inductions and culturally-specific biases in construal and 
organization of information. The view of culture as a patterned distribution of cognitions and 
behaviors, which we used in this paper, set the stage for addressing issues of learning, inference, 
and transmission of information, within and between cultural groups. 
To explain cultural consensus and stabilization of folkecology, we focused on the likely 
causal roles of (historically conditioned) mind-internal mental models for representing and 
processing cultural cognitions, and on mind-external ecological factors (including social 
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arrangements) for transmitting cultural cognitions. We found that statistically consensual cultural 
cognitions and practices – or “cultures” for short – involve complex causal chains that go both 
inside and outside the mind. These chains irreducibly link individual minds and their internal 
representations with psycho-physical interactions between individuals and their external 
environment (including interactions with other individuals).  
By targeting the microprocesses (including evolved cognitive aptitudes like the 
folkbiology module) by which these cultural chains form, we have sought to account for 
regularities and recurrences in socio-cultural macrophenomena. This contrasts with standard 
“explanations” in social psychology that seek to account for individual cognitions in terms of the 
“influences” of socio-cultural macrophenomena – where the material causal character of 
“influence” remains unspecified. Our approach also runs counter to accounts in anthropology, 
sociology, economics and political science that seek to explain socio-cultural macrophenomena 
in terms of the “influences” of other socio-cultural macrophenomena (e.g., unemployment as a 
“cause” of political change, see also Bloch & Sperber, 2002 for a prior formulation of this point). 
In sum, we have tried to illustrate a unified approach to culture and cognition that takes 
us from individuals’ evolved cognitive aptitudes to historically contingent collective practices 
(such as managing a rainforest) in systematic and reliable ways. We have described the general 
character of the likely causal factors and linkages involved, although we have only set the stage 
for inquiry into the actual causal processes and occurrences at work. Nevertheless, we have 
found in this endeavor that the study of culture formation and cross-cultural relations requires 
careful attention to group dynamics as well as individual psychological processes. To causally 
understand cultural cognition and behavior, anthropology and psychology must be close 
companions. 
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Table 1.  Approaches to cultural research and their stance on five issues   
 
  
Issues 
   
Approach How should culture be 
studied? 
Cultural Change Within-cultural 
Variability 
Cognitive Processes and 
their Relevance 
Role of Domain 
Specific 
Processes 
1. Shared Norms 
and Values 
Shared values, ideas, 
customs 
Viewed as loss Viewed as noise Learning and memory Not addressed 
2. Cultural 
Psychology 
Shared values, worldviews, 
processing mechanisms 
Not addressed Not addressed Inference, reasoning, 
perception (cognitive "tool 
box") 
Not addressed 
3. Situated Cognition Cognitions, belief systems 
and artifacts 
Cultures are 
dynamic 
Variability associated 
with different practices 
and artifacts 
Distributed, often context-
specific 
Important to 
development 
4. Culture as 
Superorganism 
Emergent system affecting 
individuals 
Adaptive Acknowledged, but not 
relevant 
Ignored as inappropriate 
unit of analysis 
Depends on 
domain-specific 
functionality 
5. Culture as 
Grammar 
Shared knowledge, 
procedures, rules 
Not addressed Not addressed Mental structures revealed 
by cross-cultural 
comparisons 
Not addressed 
6. I-Culture Bounded rule-like system 
organized by cognitive 
processes 
Not addressed Driven by E-culture Universal cultural 
acquisition device 
Important 
7. Agent Based 
Modeling of Culture 
Beliefs, rules and norms as 
products of simple micro-
processes 
May be emergent 
outcome from 
perturbation of 
steady state; 
dynamic 
Treated as signal, key 
to analyzing cultural 
transmission processes 
Imitation, rule following Not usually 
addressed 
8. Cultural 
Epidemiology 
Distribution of ideas, beliefs 
and behavior in ecological 
contexts 
Cultures are 
dynamic 
Treated as signal, key 
to analyzing cultural 
processes 
Inference, reasoning, 
perception and notions of 
relevance 
Important 
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Table 2. Peten forest plants and animals
Ref. Plant name Scientific name Ref. Animal name Scientific name 
      
 FRUIT TREES   ARBOREAL 
ANIMALS 
 
P1 * ramon Brosimum alicastrum A1 bat Chiroptera 
P2 * chicozapote Manilkara achras A2 spider monkey Ateles geoffroyi 
P3 * ciricote Cordia dodecandra A3 howler monkey Allouatta pigra 
P4 * allspice Pimenta diocia   A. palliata 
P5 * strangler fig Ficus obtusifolia A4 kinkajou Potus flavus 
  F. aurea A5 coatimundi Nasua narica 
 PALMS  A6 squirrel Sciurius deppei 
P6 * guano Sabal mauritiiforme   S. aureogaster 
P7 * broom palm Crysophilia stauracantha    
P8 * corozo Orbignya cohune  BIRDS  
  Scheelea lundellii A7 crested guan Penelope purpurascens 
P9 xate Chamaedorea elegans A8 great curassow Crax rubra 
  C. erumpens A9 ocellated turkey Meleagris ocellata 
  C. oblongata A10 tinamou Tinamou major 
P10 pacaya Chamaedorea tepejilote   Crypturellus sp. 
P11 chapay Astrocaryum mexicanum A11 toucan Ramphastos sulfuratus 
   A12 parrot Psittacidae in part 
 GRASSES / 
HERBS 
 A13 scarlet macaw Ara macao 
P12 herb/underbrush (various families) A14 chachalaca Ortalis vetula 
P13 grasses Cyperaceae/Poaceae A15 pigeon/dove Columbidae  
      
 OTHER PLANTS   RUMMAGERS  
P14 * mahogany Swietenia macrophylla A16 collared peccary Tayassu tacaju 
P15 * cedar Cedrela mexicana A17 white-lipped pecc. Tayassu pecari 
P16 * ceiba Ceiba pentandra A18 paca Cuniculus paca 
P17 * madrial Gliricidia sepium A19 agouti Dasyprocta punctata 
P18 * chaltekok Caesalpinia velutina A20 red-brocket deer Mazama americana 
P19 * manchich Lonchocarpus castilloi A21 white-tailed deer Odocoileus virginianus 
P20 * jabin Piscidia piscipula A22 tapir Tapirus bairdii 
P21 * santamaria Calophyllum brasilense A23 armadillo Dasypus novemcintus 
P22 * amapola Pseudobombax ellipticum    
  Bernoullia flammea  PREDATORS  
P23 * yaxnik Vitex gaumeri A24 jaguar Felis onca 
P24 * kanlol Senna racemosa A25 margay Felis wiedii 
P25 * pukte Bucida buceras A26 mountain lion Felis concolor 
P26 * water vine Vitis tilaefolia A27 boa Boa constrictor 
P27 cordage vine Cnestidium rufescens A28 fer-de-lance Bothrops asper 
P28 killer vines (various epiphytes) A29 laughing falcon Herpetotheres cachinnans 
            
* Species counted in tree-frequency study  
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Table 3. Rankings of human impact on plants and ecological centrality for Itza’, Ladinos and 
Q’eqchi’.  
“Human impact” is assessed on a scale from negative (-1) through neutral (0) to positive 
(+1), with individual responses added and the sum then divided by the sample population 
size. “Ecological centrality” for a given plant is the proportion of plant-animal associations in 
the population’s consensual ecological model for that plant. Latin names for plants are given 
in Table 2. 
                 
          
 Itza'   Ladino   Q'eqchi'  
impact centrality plant impact centrality plant impact centrality plant 
                  
         
1.00 0.66 ramon 0.75 0.20 ceiba 0.33 0.04 guano 
1.00 0.64 chicle 0.58 0.15 pacaya 0.25 0.09 corozo 
0.83 0.10 cedar 0.58 0.10 xate 0.08 0.07 grasses 
0.83 0.49 ciricote 0.55 0.16 allspice 0.00 0.17 amapola 
0.83 0.11 mahogany 0.50 0.47 ciricote 0.00 0.02 cordage vine
0.75 0.21 xate 0.42 0.61 chicle 0.00 0.00 chapay 
0.67 0.05 ceiba 0.33 0.12 madrial 0.00 0.04 ciricote 
0.67 0.42 guano 0.33 0.64 ramon 0.00 0.08 broom palm
0.67 0.09 madrial 0.17 0.14 cedar 0.00 0.01 jabin 
0.67 0.38 allspice 0.17 0.36 guano 0.00 0.00 kanlol 
0.58 0.26 amapola 0.17 0.25 grasses 0.00 0.07 madrial 
0.58 0.13 chapay 0.08 0.30 mahogany 0.00 0.02 pacaya 
0.58 0.09 corozo 0.00 0.29 amapola 0.00 0.00 allspice 
0.58 0.32 broom palm 0.00 0.17 water vine 0.00 0.01 pukte 
0.58 0.21 pacaya 0.00 0.22 corozo 0.00 0.21 ramon 
0.50 0.35 grasses 0.00 0.00 yaxnik 0.00 0.02 santamaria 
0.42 0.07 chaltekok -0.13 0.14 pukte 0.00 0.20 yaxnik 
0.42 0.17 jabin -0.14 0.01 chaltekok 0.00 0.05 herbs 
0.42 0.06 manchich -0.18 0.11 santamaria -0.08 0.15 strangler fig
0.25 0.16 santamaria -0.25 0.06 cordage vine -0.08 0.03 water vine 
0.17 0.39 herbs -0.25 0.25 herbs -0.08 0.00 chaltekok 
0.08 0.48 strangler fig -0.33 0.09 broom palm -0.08 0.02 killer vines 
0.08 0.28 yaxnik -0.44 0.13 jabin -0.25 0.05 ceiba 
-0.25 0.15 pukte -0.50 0.20 chapay -0.25 0.01 manchich 
-0.33 0.07 water vine -0.60 0.00 manchich -0.25 0.04 xate 
-0.33 0.01 cordage vine -0.67 0.60 strangler fig -0.58 0.14 chicle 
-0.58 0.03 kanlol -0.67 0.24 killer vines -0.67 0.12 cedar 
-0.58 0.09 killer vines -0.75 0.06 kanlol -0.75 0.09 mahogany 
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Figure 1. Social networks for Itza’, Ladinos, and immigrant Q’eqchi’. Circle graphs (top) and 
multidimensional scaling (bottom) are alternative representations of the same data sets. 
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Notes  
                                                 
1 The analogy with Darwin’s work on biological species is incomplete in that people may see themselves as 
part of specific cultures and often act differently because of this identification. For example, information 
might or might not be shared across the boundaries of self-identified cultures.   
2 Functionalism, which is alive and well in biology, should not be confused with functionalism in 
anthropology, which has been in decline for at least half a century. Functionalism in anthropology, a 
dying metaphor, was initially derived from 19th-century biological functionalism, which has since 
developed into an insightful and instrumental research strategy. One immediate drawback to 
functionalism in the study of human societies is that takes no account of intention and other critical 
aspects of human cognition. In biology, disregard of intention led to a breakthrough in understanding. In 
anthropology, it led to an ossified form of naïve realism that took (often ethnocentric) summary 
descriptions of exotic and colonized societies for the way things truly were (or supposed to be). To a 
significant extent, the present-day focus of much of anthropology - in cultural studies and postmodernism 
- is a reaction to functionalism’s procrustean view of society. Unfortunately, rather than seek a new 
scientific approach that would renew dialogue with the other sciences, the dominant trend in 
contemporary anthropology has been to forsake all attempt at scientific generalization and to dwell on the 
incommensurability and irreducible diversity of different cultural representations and behaviors. 
3 Sober and Wilson cite numerous examples from a world-wide ethnographic survey, The Human 
Relations Area Files (HRAF), first compiled by anthropologist George Murdock over half a century ago 
(Murdock 1949), in order to “demonstrate” that human cultures are functionally built and maintained as 
superorganisms (cf. Wilson, 2002). But analyses based on the HRAF that purportedly demonstrate the 
functionalism of “group-level traits,” or “norms,” and group selection face problems of circularity 
because the entries to the HRAF were chosen and structured so as to meet Murdock’s selection criteria for 
being properly “scientific” - that is, functionally discrete parts of an “adaptive” social structure, existing 
independently of individuals but patterning their behaviors in lawful ways.  
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4 A counter-current to structuralism developed in anthropology, known as “cultural materialism” and 
spearheaded by Marvin Harris. The emphasis is supposed to be on “objective, etic” units of behavior and 
material patternings of practices, artifacts, population settlements and so forth, rather than on “subjective, 
emic” notions of meaning and thought (by analogy with phonetic versus phonemic analysis in linguistics). 
A mixture of Marxism and functionalism, cultural materialism relies on what is (at least to us) a wholly 
mysterious notion of “cause” that somehow produces ideas from behaviors. For example, according to 
Harris, the Aztec religious practice of large-scale human sacrifice stems from the fact that Mesoamerica 
has relatively few large mammals; hence, apart from the other humans they eat, people in the region have 
few substantial sources of protein (Harris 1974). This sort of analysis resonates with many of the 
assumptions of sociobiology. According to biologist Edward O. Wilson, « some of the most baffling of 
religious practices in history might have an ancestry passing in a straight line back to the ancient 
carnivorous practices of humankind » (Wilson 1978:98). Such accounts often invoke ordinary material 
causes (genetic adaptations for carnivorous behavior) to explain ordinary material effects (cannibalism). 
Nevertheless, they fail to provide a hint of how the putative distal causes (genetic) enter into known 
material relationships with more proximate causes (mental and public representations) to actually produce 
the forms of behavior to be explained (religious beliefs, practices and artifacts causally-connected within 
and between human minds and bodies). Such accounts hand-wave away the « superstructure » or 
« ideology » of cultural forms as «nonmaterial» or «epiphenomenal» « by-products » of underlying 
material causes (ecological, economic or genetic) (see Atran, 2002, ch. 8). We hold that ideas are just as 
material as behaviors and indispensably constitutive of the causal chains that produce cultural regularities. 
5 In 1974, Atran interviewed Lévi-Strauss and asked him why he believed binary operators to be one of 
the fundamental structures of the human mind. He replied: “When I started there was still no science of 
mind. Saussure, Marx, Mauss and music were my guides. Since then things have changed. Psychology 
now has something to say.” 
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6 In all fairness, Pinker (2002:65) explicitly calls for treating cultural phenomena in terms of an 
“epidemiology of mental representations” in the sense of Sperber (see below), and is well aware of the 
diverse and partial character of distributions of mental representations among individuals in a population. 
This makes his analogy of I-grammar with I-culture all the more puzzling. 
7 There is much mystery and obfuscation surrounding the notion of “emergent” structures and processes. 
One thing emergence is not (at least from an agent-based modeling perspective) is an ontological trait 
over and above the constituent individual decisions and actions that give rise to it. The aim of agent-based 
modeling is, precisely, to identify the microprocesses that are necessary and sufficient to deductively 
generate the macrostructures (Axelrod, 1997b). Nevertheless, actual modeling may (and often does) fall 
short of this goal because no explanation, in terms of microprocesses, may be fully available at present. In 
this sense (of not yet reducible in practice but expectedly reducible in principle), mental structures may be 
considered “emergent” from networks of neuronal activity (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), or the laws of 
biology “emergent” from physics (cf. Nagel, 1961). In addition, even where a reduction is in principle 
possible, it may be more efficient and effective to perform analyses at higher levels, just as it is more 
efficient and effective to analyze a computer program at an algorithmic level than at a machine level (or at 
the level of the physics which implements machine level codes). 
8 The notion of “cultural epidemiology” has two distinct traditions: one focused on the relatively high-
fidelity “reproduction” and patterning of cultural (including psychological) traits within and across human 
populations, and one focused on the ways cognitive structures “generate” and chain together ideas, 
artifacts and behaviors within and across human populations. Jacques Monod (1971), the Nobel-Prize 
biologist, was the first to use the concept of “culture as contagion” – although more as metaphor than 
theory. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) were pioneers in working out a theory in which culture is 
conceptualized as distributed through a population; however, no micro-scale cognitive processes or 
structures were modeled or considered, only macro-scale social psychological traits. 
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Two more fully-developed epidemiological approaches soon emerged. Boyd and Richerson 
(1985) were able to show how biases in transmission, such as prestige or conformism, could help to 
explain the spread and stabilization of macro-social psychological traits among populations. Sperber 
(1985) provided the first theoretical blueprint for how individual-level micro-cognitive structures (as 
opposed to invocation of imitation or other cultural reproduction processes) could account for cultural 
transmission and stabilization. Until now, there has been little fruitful interaction between these two 
traditions (see Laland & Brown, 2002, but also Henrich & Boyd, 2002 ). We believe that these two 
“epidemiological” traditions are compatible, and our empirical example suggests that they can be 
mutually informative (see section, “The Learning Landscape,” below).  
9 A reviewer correctly pointed out that stability is also determined by the real world consequences of 
ideas. The spread and persistence of cultural representations will also be affected by their effects and by 
the law of unintended consequences. Prior historical contingencies and differences within and between 
groups (economic, social, military), unforeseen events and feedback loops (e.g., of stereotyping on the 
beliefs and behaviors of those who are stereotyped) alter outcomes associated with even the most stable 
representations. These altered outcomes, in turn, affect the efficacy (and, hence, stability) of the 
representations and associated actions intended to produce the outcomes. 
10 There are a few simplifying assumptions associated with the use of the CCM as a data model. One is 
the sorting method produces interval data and that the “answer key” consists of the simple mean (rather 
than a weighted mean based on competence scores). The other is that individual response characteristics 
(e.g. response bias) do not contribute to the correlation between two individuals (Batchelder, Personal 
Communication. 1/26/04, Romney, 1998, see also Batchelder and Romney, 1988). Using hierarchical 
sorting rather than simple sorting reduces the potential contribution of response bias and in other 
applications we apply a correction for guessing (Atran, et al, 1999; Medin et al, in press). 
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11  This method is potentially flawed if the assumption of item homogeneity is violated. In that case 
overall agreement and residual agreement may be spuriously correlated. Accordingly, we typically use 
within- versus between-group residual agreement as our measure. 
12 This is not the only interpretation. Asymmetrical residual agreement can arise if the in-group consensus 
is weaker in one of two groups of equal size. For example, if the Ladinos are shifting from a consensual 
agreement that no relation is present to the Itza’ belief that some relation is present, then one might well 
observe asymmetrical residual agreement. Indeed, when we do a CCM tha just combines Itza’ and Ladino 
data, the asymmetry reverses; that is, the Ladinos, but not the Itza’, show reliable residual agreement. 
13 Participants were given two scores for each pairing of animal and plant groups, reflecting the 
proportion of positive and negative interactions acknowledged. A score of .25 for negative arboreal-fruit 
interactions indicates that the participant identified negative interactions between one-quarter of all 
possible pairings of arboreal animals and fruiting plants. Scores were entered into 2 (type of interaction: 
positive, negative) X 4 (animal group: bird, rummage, arboreal, predator) X 4 (plant: fruit, grass/herb, 
palm, other) analyses of variance. Thus, tests of plants by animals had 9,99 degrees of freedom. Ladinos 
showed main effects of interaction type (F[1,11] = 6.95, p < .05), plant (F[3,33] = 9.89, p < .0001), and 
animal (F[3,33] = 14.40, p < .0001) but not plant by animal interaction. 
14 Persons C1-R are women, A-Q are men. At the top center of the Ladino circle graph is person D1. This 
is the same person as W in the Itza' network (he is the mayor of the municipality and the only Itza’ in the 
Ladino social network). 
15 Ethnographic interpretation of the MDS scaling reveals an Itza' community divided into two social 
factions: one dominated by Y, the other by V–W and T-N. Person V is W's father and person T is N’s 
father. V and T are also cited as the two of the top three Itza' forest experts. Y and V head two families 
that have continuous genealogical links to preconquest Itza' clans of the same name, Chayax and Tesucun. 
16 For Ladinos, 3 of the 4 most cited experts are also the 3 named most by Itza'. We combined Itza’ and 
Ladino responses about plant-animal relations and found a metacultural consensus (first factor scores all 
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positive, ratio eigenvalue 1:2 = 10.4, variance accounted for = 52%). Then we regressed gender and 
frequency of being cited as an expert against Ladino first factor scores in the combined consensus model. 
The r2 on Ladino scores was .63 (F(2,10)=6.97, p=.02) with gender (p=.02) and expertise (p=.008) 
reliable. One subgroup of men (with one woman) averaged 5.8 expert citations, 6.0 social network 
citations and an average culture competence (i.e., mean of first factor scores) of .73 (vs. .75 for Itza’). 
Averages for the other subgroup (with one man) were respectively 0, 1.3 and .59. 
17 Representations of the Itza' network indicate that the top Itza’expert, node Y, is also the best socially-
connected individual (Figure 1). His expertise has been independently confirmed. For example, in the 
Bailenson et al. (2000) study of tropical bird classification among American birdwatchers and Itza', Y 
scored highest among Itza’ on measures of correspondence with scientific (classical evolutionary) 
taxonomy. The Ladino network points to the most cited Ladino expert I as the best socially-connected 
individual in his community. He is also the founder of the community.  
18 We have independent evidence that people in these communities form and use taxonomic hierarchies 
that correspond fairly well with classical scientific taxonomy (and especially so at the generic species 
level). For example, using standard sorting experiments (see Medin & Atran, 2004), we elicited highly 
consensual mammal taxonomies (see López et al. 1997). For each population there was a single factor 
solution (I = 7.2:1, 61%; L = 5.9:1, 50%); Q = 5.8:1, 48%). First factor loadings were uniformly positive, 
and mean first factor scores reflected highly shared competence for each population (I= 77, L = .71, Q 
=.68). The aggregated Ladino taxonomy correlated equally with Itza' and Q'eqchi' taxonomies (r = .85), 
indicating very similar structures and contents. All three populations grouped taxa according to general-
purpose similarity rather than special-purpose concerns (e.g, wild peccary with domestic pig, house cat 
with margay, etc). Special purpose-clusters, such as domestic vs. wild, or edible vs. nonedible, can also be 
elicited (Lois 1998); but they do not belong to the general consensus of “kinds that go together by nature” 
(cf. the idiosyncratic version of “Itza’ folk taxonomy” in Hofling & Tesucun 1997). 
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19 One might interpret this cultural bias toward reciprocity as a shared abstract expectation, but it requires 
additional supportive observations. 
20 As researchers have noted (Baron and Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003), although people with sacred 
values sometimes seem to treat them as having infinite utility (e.g., in refusing to consider tradeoffs), this 
is something of a logical impossibility inasmuch as infinite value implies that people with such values 
should spend literally all their time and effort protecting and promoting that value. For this reason, these 
researchers (see also Thompson and Gonzales, 1997) suggest that such values may be only pseudo-sacred, 
further noting that people with protected values may nonetheless engage in indirect tradeoffs. One may be 
tempted to think of protected values as self-serving “posturing,” but the reality of acts such as suicide 
bombings undermines this stance (Atran, 2003). Moreover, protected values necessary to an individual’s 
identity may take on truly absolute value only when value-related identity seems threatened with 
extinction, just as food may take on absolute value only when sustenance for life is threatened. 
21 The consensus was much weaker and limited to the Menominee experts for reciprocal relations. In this 
case, we found consensus for reported reciprocal relations only in regard to raw observed agreement. 
